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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 There is a split in the circuits regarding whether and when 
agency regulations may establish rights enforceable through 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983.1 The District of Columbia Circuit and Sixth Circuit 
have held that at least some valid federal regulations may create 
rights enforceable through § 1983.2 Concluding that only Congress, 
by enacting a statute, may create an individually enforceable right, 
however, the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an 
agency regulation cannot create an individual federal right enforce-
able through § 1983, although some decisions in these circuits have 
recognized that valid regulations may help courts interpret, “define,” 
or “flesh out” the content of statutory rights.3 Most recently, in 2003, 
the Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit4 held that 
valid agency regulations alone could not establish individual rights 
enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish en-
forceable rights through statutes, although one judge disagreed in a 
                                                                                                                    
 1. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (2000)); Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and 
the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613, 613-14 (discussing split in cir-
cuits over whether regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Brian D. Galle, Can Fed-
eral Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?: A Theoretical Approach, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 163, 164 n.3, 171-76 (2003) (same); Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: 
The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1460-61, 1465-69 
(2003) [hereinafter Mank, The Future After Gonzaga] (same); Bradford C. Mank, Using § 
1983 to Enforce Title VI’s Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 346-53 (2001) 
[hereinafter Mank, Using § 1983] (same); Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Be-
tween Administrative Regulations and Section 1983’s “Laws,” 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 
76-80 (1998) (discussing conflicting approaches among the federal circuit courts); Derek 
Black, Comment, Picking up the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private 
Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 363-76 (2002) (same); Recent 
Case, Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 
735, 735 (2003) (same); Sam Spital, Note, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After 
Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 111-20 (2003) 
(same); infra notes 2-7, 43, 136-54 and accompanying text.  
 2. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding FCC 
regulations enforceable through § 1983 and stating that “[a]s federal regulations have the 
force of law, they likewise may create enforceable rights”); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 
770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding HUD regulations enforceable through § 1983 
and citing the “force and effect” standard articulated in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 301-03 (1979)); see also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(stating Title VI regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Langlois v. Abington Hous. 
Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47-54 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding properly promulgated regula-
tions are enforceable through § 1983, although recognizing that the First Circuit had never 
decided issue); Davant, supra note 1, at 614 (identifying the District of Columbia and Sixth 
Circuits as having “held that an agency can create an individual federal right”); Recent 
Case, supra note 1, at 735 n.3 (citing Loschiavo and Samuels). 
 3. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 784-
90 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that regulations alone may not create rights enforceable 
through § 1983); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-12 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Smith v. 
Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Davant, supra note 1, at 614 (identifying 
the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as having held that an agency cannot cre-
ate an individual federal right); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735 n.3 (citing South Cam-
den, Harris, and Smith). 
 4. 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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partial dissent.5 By contrast, in the same year, the First Circuit in 
Rolland v. Romney6 acknowledged that regulations by themselves 
could not establish enforceable rights, but the court concluded that 
an agency’s regulations interpreting a statutory right could clarify 
the right so that it is sufficiently definite to be enforceable through a 
§ 1983 suit.7 
 The Supreme Court has never directly answered the question 
whether § 1983 suits may enforce valid administrative regulations,8 
although several of its decisions have important implications for this 
issue.9 In 1980, in Maine v. Thiboutot,10 the Supreme Court held that 
a violation of statutory rights may be remedied through § 1983 be-
cause the plain meaning of the phrase “and laws” in the statute au-
thorized plaintiffs to bring claims under the statute based on viola-
tions of federal statutory rights.11 A crucial issue is whether the 
phrase “and laws” in § 1983 includes regulations or only refers to 
statutes.12 Additionally, even if regulations are considered “laws” for 
purposes of § 1983, there is the further issue of whether agency regu-
lations can establish individual “rights” under § 1983.13  
 Although the Supreme Court collectively has not answered the 
question whether administrative regulations can establish individual 
rights that are enforceable when they are only implicit in a statute, 
individual Justices have suggested their views on this subject.14 In 
                                                                                                                    
 5. Compare id. at 935-44 (“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create indi-
vidual rights enforceable through § 1983.”), with id. at 946-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in 
part) and Recent Case, supra note 1, at 739-42 (criticizing Ninth Circuit’s holding in Save 
Our Valley that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 
1983 as contrary to well-established administrative law principles). Judge Berzon agreed 
with the majority, however, that the Title VI regulations at issue could not be enforced 
through § 1983. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 961-65 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); see in-
fra Part VI.A.  
 6. 318 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 7. Id. at 48-58. 
 8. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936-37; Davant, supra note 1, at 613, 628. 
 9. See infra notes 10-11, 17-18, 21-22, 24-27, 33-38, 57-59, 61, 64, 66-69, 79-81, 84-
86, 89-97, 101, 104-05, 107, 109-10, 118, 128-35, 158, 161, 168-72, 176-77, 186, 200-04, 208, 
213-14, 225-29, 235, 324-25 and accompanying text. 
 10. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
 11. See id. at 4-8; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330; Pettys, supra note 1, at 
67. Section 1983 has remained unchanged since 1980 and provides as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . [or] regulation . . . of any State 
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 12. See infra notes 14-19, 30, 49-57, 66-76, 76, 103-05, 168 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Davant, supra note 1, at 624; infra notes 14-19, 24-42, 105-06, 116-27, 131-32, 
136-37, 139-54, 225-26, 228-29, 287 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Davant, supra note 1, at 613. 
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1983, in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of New York,15 
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, argued that § 1983 could be 
used to enforce “all valid federal laws, including statutes and regula-
tions having the force of law.”16 In 1987, in Wright v. City of Roanoke 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority,17 the Supreme Court held, in 
a five-to-four decision, that the Brooke Amendment to the Housing 
Act of 1937 and HUD regulations interpreting the statute could cre-
ate enforceable rights under § 1983, but the Court left unclear to 
what extent it had relied on the regulations alone to reach this con-
clusion.18 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor contended that 
the majority opinion was “troubling” to the extent that it suggested 
or implied that regulations alone could establish enforceable rights 
through a § 1983 suit.19  
 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,20 the Supreme Court, in 1984, stated that courts should give 
significant deference to agency regulations that provide a reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute or that fill a “gap” in a silent 
statute, at least in those cases in which Congress has delegated to 
the agency the authority to issue regulations that carry “the force of 
law.”21 Conversely, if a statute has a clear meaning regarding a spe-
                                                                                                                    
 15. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 16. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). 
 18. The Court stated:  
The regulations . . . defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utili-
ties, have the force of law. . . . In our view, the benefits Congress intended to 
confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable 
rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, 
beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. 
Id. at 431-32 (citation omitted). Additionally, in a footnote, the majority stated: “The dis-
sent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income 
tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations 
were fully authorized by the statute.” Id. at 421 n.3. Commentators have debated the ex-
tent to which the Wright majority relied on the regulations alone in establishing a right to 
sue under § 1983. Compare Davant, supra note 1, at 621 (“Although the Wright Court ex-
pressed no opinion as to whether the regulation created individual federal rights inde-
pendent from federal statute, the Justices in the majority may have tacitly assumed that 
regulations can create rights.”), Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 343 (“It is not clear 
whether the [Wright] majority simply deferred to the HUD regulation as a reasonable in-
terpretation of the statutory phrase ‘rent’ or held that the regulations themselves may es-
tablish a private cause of action under § 1983.”), and Pettys, supra note 1, at 74-75 (same), 
with Spital, supra note 1, at 116 (“Wright located the alleged right in the statutory provi-
sion and then relied upon the implementing regulations to define and interpret that 
right.”). 
 19. Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, Using § 1983, supra 
note 1, at 344-45. 
 20. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (stating that both courts and agencies are bound by 
clear statutory language addressing the precise issue in question); see also Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 741. 
 21. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (stating courts should defer to an agency’s “per-
missible” interpretation of an ambiguous statute or filling of a “gap” in a silent statute); id. 
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cific issue in an agency’s enabling statute, then courts will not defer 
to an agency interpretation that fails to follow that meaning because 
the agency is bound by that statutory language.22 The Chevron Court 
stated:  
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a spe-
cific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regula-
tions are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.23 
 In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval,24 the Court indirectly cast 
doubt on the use of regulations to create enforceable rights by hold-
ing that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.25 The Court concluded that a private right of action must be 
based on a clear statement of rights plainly established in the statute 
itself and may not arise from regulations alone, declaring that 
“[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that 
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right 
that Congress has not.”26 The Court suggested that regulations alone 
may not establish individual rights, observing that “it is most cer-
tainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a 
private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. 
Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer 
                                                                                                                    
at 865-66 (stressing that executive agencies have a more appropriate role than the judici-
ary in defining ambiguous statutory language or filling in a “gap” in a silent statute be-
cause they possess greater substantive expertise than courts and because agencies, unlike 
courts, are politically accountable through election of the Chief Executive); United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-30 (2001) (discussing Chevron); John F. Manning, Consti-
tutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 (1996) (describing the presumption established in Chevron 
that silence in a statute shows the intent of Congress to leave the act of interpretation in 
the hands of the agency in charge of administering the act); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin 
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34, passim (2001) (explaining that 
Chevron fundamentally expanded deference of courts to agency interpretations of statutes 
by presuming that gaps or ambiguities in a statute reflected implicit congressional intent 
to delegate interpretive authority to the agency); infra notes 23, 186-99, 289 and accompa-
nying text. 
 22. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (stating that both courts and agencies are bound by 
clear statutory language addressing the precise issue in question); see also Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 741. 
 23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (“Delegation of such 
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudi-
cation or notice-and-comment rulemaking or by some other indication of a comparable con-
gressional intent.”); Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Where an agency 
has been endowed with the power to administer a congressionally created program, as 
here, regulations should be given substantial deference . . . .”). 
 24. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 25. Id. at 291. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added); Galle, supra note 1, at 165, 170, 177-78 (discussing 
Sandoval as adopting a “clear statement rule” for private rights of action). 
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himself.”27 Although Justice Scalia refused to apply Chevron defer-
ence to agency Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate impact dis-
crimination because the Court had construed Title VI to ban only in-
tentional discrimination, he acknowledged in Sandoval that “regula-
tions, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute it-
self.”28 
 In his dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens contended 
that Section 60229 regulations could be enforced indirectly under § 
1983 even if they could not create an implied right of action directly 
because regulations are “laws” within the statute’s meaning.30 Addi-
tionally, he argued that the majority’s refusal to defer to the agency’s 
Section 602 regulations was contrary to the Court’s Chevron deci-
sion.31 Justice Stevens argued, “In most other contexts, when the 
agencies charged with administering a broadly worded statute offer 
regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete guidance as 
to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of the statute’s 
breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable construc-
tion of the statutory text.”32  
                                                                                                                    
 27. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. 
 28. Id. at 284; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000). 
 30. According to Justice Stevens: 
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely be-
cause they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI 
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to en-
force the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only 
reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case (or other 
similarly situated individuals) presumably retain the option of rechallenging 
Alabama’s English-only policy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after to-
day’s decision.  
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Mank, Using § 1983, 
supra note 1, at 367-82 (arguing Title VI disparate impact regulations may be enforced 
through § 1983).  
 31. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 309 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)); see also Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 530 (2002) (arguing that the majority opinion in Sandoval ignored 
the Chevron deference principle); Jonathan M.H. Short, “Something of a Sport:” The Effect 
of Sandoval on Title IX Disparate Impact Discrimination Suits, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 119, 133 (2002); Black, supra note 1, at 361-62 (arguing agency interpretations of Title 
VI deserve deference); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the 
Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 
31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 65, 92-101 (2004) (arguing Justice Scalia’s Sandoval deci-
sion was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s Section 602 disparate impact regula-
tions because they are entitled to deference under Chevron, because the term “discrimina-
tion” in Section 602 is ambiguous and disparate impact regulations are reasonable inter-
pretation of statute); Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possi-
bilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1781 (2003) (arguing Justice 
Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s Section 602 dis-
parate impact regulations because they deserve deference under Chevron, because Section 
602 is ambiguous and disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretation and 
means to effectuate Section 601’s antidiscrimination requirement). 
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 In 2002, in Gonzaga University v. Doe,33 the Supreme Court held 
that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act’s34 non-
disclosure provisions were not privately enforceable through § 1983.35 
The Court concluded that individual rights enforceable through § 
1983 are similar to implied rights of action because courts are re-
quired to “determine whether Congress intended to create a federal 
right.”36 Because the Court held in Sandoval that only Congress can 
create implied rights of action, the Gonzaga decision suggests that 
only Congress can create rights enforceable through § 1983 and that 
regulations alone may not.37 The Gonzaga decision did not directly 
resolve, however, whether and to what extent regulations may inter-
pret rights implicit in a statute.38 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit in 
Save Our Valley read dicta in Sandoval and Gonzaga too broadly in 
suggesting the erroneous conclusion that courts may never consider 
agency regulations in determining whether rights are enforceable 
pursuant to § 1983.  
 It is not clear whether the Chevron decision or similar deference 
principles apply to the interpretation of individual rights enforceable 
under § 1983.39 If a regulation goes beyond the explicit language of a 
statute to clarify or establish a right that is generally compatible 
with the statute’s goals, should courts treat that right as enforceable 
under § 1983? In a recent article, Charles Davant argues “that, in the 
absence of any indication in the language or legislative history of a 
regulation-authorizing statute that Congress intended to create en-
forceable rights, regulations that purport to create privately enforce-
able individual rights usually will be contrary to statutory law and 
not entitled to deference.”40 Davant contends that fundamental sepa-
                                                                                                                    
 33. 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 34. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (providing that educational institutions will not disclose 
student records to the public).  
 35. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287-91; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1450-52. 
 36. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1448. 
 37. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We be-
lieve the Supreme Court’s Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, taken together, compel the 
conclusion we reach today: that agency regulations cannot independently create rights en-
forceable through § 1983.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467 (“In 
light of Gonzaga, the argument that regulations alone may create rights enforceable 
through § 1983 is probably untenable because a regulation alone normally cannot provide 
‘clear’ and ‘unambiguous’ evidence that Congress intended to establish an individual 
right.”). 
 38. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467-69. 
 39. See infra notes 40-43, 197-99 and accompanying text. 
 40. Davant, supra note 1, at 615. But see Galle, supra note 1, at 165, 177-92, 226-28 
(arguing valid agency regulations are laws based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
term “laws” in § 1983 and therefore are entitled to Chevron deference); Galalis, supra note 
32, at 65, 92-101 (arguing Title VI’s disparate impact regulations are valid laws under § 
1983 and therefore are entitled to Chevron deference). 
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ration of powers principles give Congress the sole authority to create 
individual rights that are enforceable under § 1983.41   
 By contrast, although acknowledging that special care is required 
in evaluating the authority of agency regulations purporting to estab-
lish individual rights, this Article argues that courts should defer to 
agency regulations that clarify or further define individual rights 
reasonably implicit in a statute without contradicting the central un-
derlying principle in Sandoval and Gonzaga that Congress alone 
possesses the legislative authority necessary to create individual 
rights in a statute.42 The First Circuit’s Romney decision is a good 
example of a court using agency regulations to clarify the scope of a 
right that Congress clearly intended to create in a statute, but ap-
propriately chose to delegate the details of its implementation to an 
agency.43 As Parts VI and VII demonstrate, where Congress man-
dates or clearly implies that it is delegating to an agency the author-
ity to issue regulations implementing an individual right that Con-
gress intends to create on behalf of a class of individuals, then the 
agency’s interpretation of the statutory “rights” contained in its regu-
lations are presumptively enforceable through § 1983.44 
II.   SECTION 1983 SUITS AND “FEDERAL LAW” 
A.   History of “and Laws” in § 1983 Suits 
 Section 1983 has its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Ku 
Klux Klan Act, which created a private right of action for persons 
who “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage of any State” were denied constitutional rights, especially 
due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.45 The main purpose of the statute was to protect Afri-
can Americans from the attempt of former Confederates to reassert 
white supremacy in several southern states by denying African 
Americans many legal rights.46 The 1871 statute protected only con-
                                                                                                                    
 41. See Davant, supra note 1, at 615-16, 633-41, 645-48; supra notes 1-3, 8, 13-14, 16, 
18-19 and accompanying text; infra notes 55-56, 58, 61, 83, 85-88, 93-95, 107, 155, 185, 
191, 196, 200 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 157-349 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra Part VI.B. 
 44. See infra notes 255-339 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (2000)); Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 
1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 303-04 (1996); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1427; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; see also Pettys, supra note 1, at 51, 54-61 
(discussing the origin of § 1983); Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: 
Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1841 
n.20 (2003). 
 46. See Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427; Mank, Using § 1983, 
supra note 1, at 327; Pettys, supra note 1, at 51-61, 67-68 (discussing the origin of § 1983). 
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stitutional rights and did not mention rights protected by federal 
law.47 
 However, in 1874, Congress, as part of a comprehensive revision 
of existing statutes, added the phrase “and laws” to section 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act.48 There is no explicit legislative history explaining 
whether Congress intended the addition of the “and laws” language 
to change the meaning of the statute.49 This revised statute is the ba-
sis for the current 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in relevant part, 
as follows:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress . . . .50 
 Commentators have long debated whether Congress’s addition of 
the phrase “and laws” changed the meaning of the statute to include 
enforcement of statutory rights.51 Proponents of the “Consistency 
Theory” argue that the language “and laws” must be read together 
with other provisions in the Civil Rights Act to limit the term “law” 
to only laws protecting equal rights.52 Conversely, proponents of the 
“No Modification Theory” narrowly interpret the addition of “and 
laws” as only a clarification of the 1871 statute’s existing protection 
                                                                                                                    
 47. Key, supra note 45, at 304; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; Pettys, su-
pra note 1, at 57. 
 48. Key, supra note 45, at 304-05; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; Pettys, 
supra note 1, at 57-60. 
 49. See Key, supra note 45, at 305 (describing the legislative history of 1874 amend-
ment to § 1983 as unhelpful); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427 
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 59-60 & 
n.59 (discussing the absence of legislative history explaining the addition of “and laws” lan-
guage in § 1983). Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of 
Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 398-409 (1982) (arguing that the 1874 legislative his-
tory is consistent with the conclusion that Congress intended § 1983 to reach all violations 
of federal law), with Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he legislative history unmistakably shows that the variations in phrasing introduced 
in the 1874 revision were inadvertent . . . .”).  
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
 51. Key, supra note 45, at 306-13 (discussing the debate concerning various interpre-
tations of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427-28 
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327-28 (same). 
 52. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623-37 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrates that the 
phrase “and laws” refers only to civil rights legislation and not federal statutes in general); 
Key, supra note 45, at 306-07 (discussing “Consistency Theory” interpretation of “and 
laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427; Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 327-28. 
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for constitutional rights.53 Finally, proponents of the “Plain Language 
Theory” contend that the term “and laws” includes all federal stat-
utes and perhaps other federal laws as well.54 
 Before 1961, there were relatively few § 1983 cases.55 From the 
nineteenth century until 1961, courts narrowly construed § 1983 
claims, limiting them to civil rights cases alleging violations of fed-
eral constitutional rights, especially deprivation of the right to make 
contracts or purchase property.56 In dicta, the Supreme Court sug-
gested in 1900 that the phrase “and laws” in the statute was limited 
to civil rights cases, and the Court did not clarify that issue for sev-
eral decades.57  
 In 1961, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape58 reinvigorated the 
statute by holding that § 1983 allowed a plaintiff alleging injury 
caused by the unconstitutional action of police officers to sue for 
damages in federal court because their actions were “under color of” 
law even if their actions also violated state law, and it also indicated 
that § 1983 could remedy a wide range of state violations of federal 
constitutional rights.59 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme 
Court allowed a broad range of suits pursuant to § 1983 and declared 
that courts should construe § 1983 “generously” to advance its broad 
                                                                                                                    
 53. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legislative history 
unmistakably shows that the variations in phrasing introduced in the 1874 revision were 
inadvertent . . . .”); Key, supra note 45, at 307-08 (discussing “No Modification Theory” in-
terpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1427 (same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328 (same). 
 54. Key, supra note 45, at 308-13 (discussing and supporting “Plain Language The-
ory” interpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1427-28; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328, 339-52 (discussing whether the 
phrase “and laws” in § 1983 allows enforcement of valid federal regulations); Sunstein, su-
pra note 49, at 398-409 (supporting “plain language” interpretation that “and laws” in § 
1983 applies to all violations of federal law). 
 55. See MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 5 (1997) (stat-
ing that some authorities estimate fewer than two dozen § 1983 cases from 1870s until 
1920s); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842 (stating the same proposition and also 
stating that § 1983 was infrequently used until 1960s).  
 56. See Davant, supra note 1, at 617-19; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1841-
43 (stating that federal courts interpreted § 1983 narrowly until 1960s). 
 57. For instance, in Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900), the Su-
preme Court concluded that federal jurisdiction was generally limited to constitutional and 
civil rights claims and suggested in dicta that “and laws” in § 1983 was limited to civil 
rights laws. See id. at 72-73; Key, supra note 45, at 314 (“Following Holt [in 1900], the Su-
preme Court was silent on the question of the proper interpretation of the ‘and laws’ lan-
guage for several decades.”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328 (observing that al-
most all pre-1980 § 1983 suits raised constitutional claims); Pettys, supra note 1, at 52 
(same); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1841-42 (stating that federal courts nar-
rowly interpreted § 1983 until 1960s). 
 58. 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). 
 59. Id.; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 619; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 
1842. 
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remedial goals.60 During the 1960s and 1970s, a few Supreme Court 
decisions suggested that a § 1983 suit might be based on a statutory 
right violation, but none of these cases clearly resolved the question 
because they focused on constitutional claims.61  
 By the late 1970s, more plaintiffs began filing § 1983 suits alleg-
ing statutory violations because the underlying substantive statutes 
did not contain an explicit private right of action.62 From 1964 until 
the late 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower courts had liberally 
construed implied private rights of action that allowed plaintiffs to 
file statutory suits even if a statute did not contain an explicit rem-
edy for individual suits; often, such statutes only explicitly allowed, 
for instance, suits by federal administrative agencies.63 By the late 
1970s, however, the Supreme Court began restricting implied private 
right of action suits by demanding that plaintiffs demonstrate that 
Congress intended to allow suits by private plaintiffs.64 It was most 
                                                                                                                    
 60. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“As remedial legislation, § 
1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (stating that § 1983 was “intended to provide a remedy, 
to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights”); 
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 742; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (stating in dicta that “[i]t is, 
of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court 
under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act 
on the part of participating States.”); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 
(1966) (citing Monroe and stating in dicta that an individual has cause of action under § 
1983 “not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for 
violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well”); Davant, supra note 
1, at 619 (observing that “the Court in the 1970s began to assume, without discussion, that 
plaintiffs could use § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Social Security Act”); Key, supra 
note 45, at 313-18; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1428; Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 328 & n.48.  
 62. See Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842-43. 
 63. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (implying a private right of action 
in Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 
U.S. 544 (1969) (implying a private right of action in Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyan-
dotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (implying a private right of action 
in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (imply-
ing a private right of action in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Key, supra note 45, at 
294 (describing the effect of Borak on private rights of action); Bradford C. Mank, Is There 
a Private Cause of Action Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Envi-
ronmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25-27 (1999) [hereinafter Mank, 
Private Right] (demonstrating that the Supreme Court or lower courts from 1964 until late 
1970s often found implied private rights of action in federal statutes); Mank, The Future 
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423; Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Im-
plied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1073-74 
(1992) (observing that between 1964 and 1975 the Supreme Court took an expansive ap-
proach to private rights of action). But see Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional In-
tent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 861, 866-67 & nn.32, 34 (1996) (arguing that courts were reluctant before 1975 to im-
ply private rights of action, except perhaps in securities area).  
 64. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) 
(“[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the pri-
vate remedy asserted . . . .”); id. at 19, 23-24; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
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likely because of new restrictions on implied right of action suits that 
plaintiffs instead began filing § 1983 suits for alleged statutory viola-
tions.65 
B.   Statutory § 1983 Suits: Thiboutot 
 It was not until 1980, when the Supreme Court held, for the first 
time, in Maine v. Thiboutot,66 that the term “and laws” in § 1983 in-
cluded a broad range of federal statutory violations.67 After finding 
the statute’s legislative history inconclusive, the Court broadly inter-
preted the plain meaning of the term “laws” in § 1983 to include all 
federal laws, rather than just the Constitution and civil rights stat-
utes.68 Thus, the Court held that plaintiffs may use § 1983 to enforce 
both constitutional and federal statutory rights, but it did not specifi-
cally address whether regulations are enforceable.69   
 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, contended that § 1983’s legislative 
history demonstrated that Congress intended the phrase “and laws” 
to apply only to equal rights statutes.70 Additionally, Powell main-
                                                                                                                    
560, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether 
this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted 
into law.”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (noting that Cort states the “crite-
ria through which [congressional] intent could be discerned”); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 
(1975) (imposing four-part test for deciding whether to imply a private right of action, with 
congressional intent being one factor). See generally Key, supra note 45, at 294-96 (explain-
ing the evolution of the Court’s private right of action jurisprudence); Mank, The Future 
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right, supra note 63, at 31-32, 44- 
46 (arguing that the Supreme Court in 1979 made congressional intent the main factor in 
determining whether to imply private right of action); Stabile, supra note 63, at 868-71 
(arguing that the Supreme Court beginning in 1979 began shifting away from four-factor 
Cort test to “an exclusive reliance on legislative intent”). 
 65. Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842-43. 
 66. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
 67. Id. at 4-8; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1430 (dis-
cussing Thiboutot’s “plain meaning” interpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 330 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 52 (same).  
 68. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-8 (rejecting the argument that “the phrase ‘and laws’ 
should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws”); Mank, The Future After 
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1430 (explaining that the Thiboutot decision concluded that “and 
laws” in § 1983 refers to federal statutory rights in general and not just civil rights laws); 
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 67 (same); Recent 
Case, supra note 1, at 742 (same); infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
 69. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-8; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330 (explaining 
that the Thiboutot decision concluded that “and laws” in § 1983 refers to most federal 
statutory rights, as well as constitutional rights); Pettys, supra note 1, at 67 (same). 
 70. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 14-22 & 19 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
legislative history of the phrase “and laws” supports limiting it to civil rights laws); see also 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623-37 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrates that the phrase “and 
laws” refers only to civil rights legislation and not federal statutes in general); Mank, The 
Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1429-30 (discussing Justice Powell’s interpretation 
in Thiboutot and Chapman that the “and laws” language in § 1983 refers only to civil 
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tained that the majority’s decision did not consider the financial im-
pacts on state and local officials resulting from broad § 1983 liability 
for violations of federal grant-in-aid programs that now funded nu-
merous state programs, often referred to as Spending Clause legisla-
tion.71 During the 1960s, the federal government rapidly expanded 
Spending Clause programs that provided money to state agencies to 
provide welfare benefits to individuals, but in exchange it also im-
posed numerous requirements on states to provide a minimum level 
of care for beneficiaries.72 Because the growth of these programs led 
to an increasing number of beneficiaries and various social move-
ments during the 1960s and 1970s, poor people became more willing 
to challenge the government73 and many beneficiaries began filing 
suits against states.74 Notably, the Thiboutot decision allowed a re-
cipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children to use § 1983 to 
sue a state for allegedly violating federal welfare policy.75 Because 
suits against state and local programs would give federal courts “un-
precedented authority to oversee state actions,” Justice Powell ar-
gued that the majority’s broad reading of § 1983 jurisdiction “creates 
a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal sys-
tem.”76 The fear that § 1983 suits often intrude on state governments 
and thus interfere with federalist concerns likely explains recent de-
cisions, such as Sandoval and Gonzaga, that have restricted such 
suits.77 
                                                                                                                    
rights legislation); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same); Pettys, supra note 
1, at 52, 67-68 (same). 
 71. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22-37 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 45, 
at 323-24 (discussing Justice Powell’s concerns in Thiboutot about the majority decision’s 
financial impact on state and local governments); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1429-31 (same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same); Pettys, su-
pra note 1, at 67-68 (discussing Justice Powell’s Thiboutot opinion).  
 72. See Key, supra note 45, at 313-18; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1428; Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards 
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 
619-23 (1972) (discussing frequent state failures to comply with federal grant-in-aid re-
quirements and reasons for “less than total success”). 
 73. See Key, supra note 45, at 314; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1428; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 72, at 600 (stating that federal outlays for aid pro-
grams increased tenfold from 1951 until 1971, from $2.4 billion to $27.6 billion); Samberg-
Champion, supra note 45, at 1843 n.27 (explaining growth in federal aid programs to 
states as one factor in increased § 1983 suits by individuals against states).  
 74. See Key, supra note 45, at 314; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1428; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1843 n.27. 
 75. 448 U.S. at 3. 
 76. Id.; see also Key, supra note 45, at 323-24 (discussing Justice Powell’s concerns in 
Thiboutot about the majority decision giving federal courts too great a role in supervising 
state and local governments); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1429-31 
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same).  
 77. See Galle, supra note 1, at 166, 170, 192-93 (suggesting the Supreme Court has 
read rights enforceable through § 1983 narrowly because of federalism concerns, but argu-
ing that § 1983 suits are compatible with federalism); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, 
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C.   The Standard for § 1983 Statutory Suits 
 Since the Thiboutot decision, a series of Supreme Court cases has 
established standards for when a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 suit to 
enforce federal statutory rights.78 To understand how the Supreme 
Court has defined rights in § 1983 cases, it is helpful to first examine 
how the Court has defined them in private right of action cases. In 
Cort v. Ash,79 a case involving an implied right of action and not a § 
1983 suit, the Court stated that the existence of a federal substantive 
right depended upon whether the person claiming the right was “one 
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.”80 The 
Court considered the question whether a statute created a “federal 
right” to be the first step in its four-step analysis of whether a stat-
ute created a private right of action.81 Subsequently, in his dissenting 
opinion in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,82 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist maintained that in § 1983 suits, the Court should use the 
same analysis of “federal rights” as it had in the Cort decision.83 In 
California v. Sierra Club,84 another private right of action case, the 
Court explained that a “general ban . . . designed to benefit the public 
at large” did not create individual federal rights but that a provision 
“created for the especial benefit of a particular class” does create en-
forceable rights.85  
 Under Cort’s especial-benefit-of-a-particular-class test, a large 
number of regulations arguably could create individual federal rights 
because numerous “regulations are promulgated for the especial 
benefit of a particular class of persons.”86 For example, Congress and 
agencies intended Title VI regulations to especially benefit racial and 
ethnic minorities,87 and they intended Title IX regulations to provide 
                                                                                                                    
supra note 1, at 1429-31 (same); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1841-42 (“Section 
1983 jurisprudence has always been driven more by judicial policy decisions about federal 
courts’ proper role in policing states than by pure statutory interpretation . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-21 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 
U.S. 103, 106-07 (1989); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436-45 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court’s evolving § 1983 jurisprudence prior to Gonzaga). 
 79. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 80. Id. at 78 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 83. See id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Davant, supra note 1, at 
631 & n.114. 
 84. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
 85. Id. at 294-95; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 631 (quoting Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 
at 294-95). 
 86. Davant, supra note 1, at 631-32 (listing examples). 
 87. Id. Section 601 of Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
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special benefits for women.88 However, the Sandoval decision has re-
stricted private right of action suits by requiring plaintiffs to demon-
strate that Congress intended to allow such suits.89   
 Influenced by its approach in implied right of action cases, the 
Court eventually began to define enforceable rights under § 1983 as 
mandatory obligations to provide specific benefits to a special class of 
persons.90 In determining whether a plaintiff may enforce a federal 
statute by filing suit under § 1983, a court initially assessed whether 
a plaintiff’s complaint alleges the violation of specific, not merely 
precatory, “federal right[s]” in a statute, whether the statute indi-
cates that those specific rights are intended for the benefit of indi-
viduals including the plaintiff, and whether those rights are capable 
of judicial enforcement.91 To determine whether a federal statute es-
tablishes specific and individually enforceable federal rights, the Su-
preme Court in Blessing v. Freestone used a three-part test:  
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question 
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so “vague and 
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. 
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obliga-
tion on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the 
asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than preca-
tory, terms.92 
                                                                                                                    
Federal financial assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)). Section 602 of Title VI states in part:  
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section [601] with respect to such program or activ-
ity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall 
be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 631; Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in 
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS 
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 23-25 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999); James H. Colopy, Note, 
The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 152-55 (1994). 
 88. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Pub. 
L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000)); Davant, su-
pra note 1, at 631-32; Black, supra note 1, at 377 n.148; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, at 
51-52 (1971) (discussing types of discriminatory practices against women that Congress in-
tended Title IX to redress). 
 89. See infra Part V.A. 
 90. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
 91. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1989); 
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, 
at 332-33; Pettys, supra note 1, at 68-69.  
 92. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (citations omitted); see Mank, 
Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 332-33. 
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The Blessing three-part test is somewhat narrower than the original 
Cort test.93 “[A] right exists when the language of a law requires the 
government to provide an unambiguous benefit to a particular per-
son.”94 If a federal statutory right meets the three-part test, there is a 
strong rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff may use § 1983 to en-
force that right.95  
 Even when the plaintiff had asserted a federal right, however, the 
Supreme Court, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National 
Sea Clammers Ass’n,96 created an exception to Thiboutot by holding 
that a § 1983 suit based on a statutory right may not proceed if a de-
fendant shows that Congress intentionally denied a remedy under § 
1983, either expressly or impliedly, by providing a thorough enforce-
ment scheme for the purpose of protecting a federal right.97 The Sea 
Clammers Court rejected the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit because the two 
federal environmental statutes at issue, the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act98 and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act,99 contained “unusually elaborate” enforcement mechanisms that 
authorized private citizens to bring injunctive actions after giving 
sixty days notice to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, the state, and the alleged violator.100 Subsequent decisions 
have limited the Sea Clammers exception to statutory § 1983 suits by 
clarifying that a defendant bears a heavy burden of proof to establish 
that a statute’s remedy and enforcement scheme are so comprehen-
sive that a court must presume that Congress did not intend to allow 
a separate remedy in a § 1983 suit. In Livadas v. Bradshaw, the 
Court declared that “apart from [some] exceptional cases, § 1983 re-
                                                                                                                    
 93. Davant, supra note 1, at 632; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 332-33. 
 94. Davant, supra note 1, at 632. 
 95. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 (1990) (ex-
plaining that courts “do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on 
§ 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right”) (quoting Wright v. City 
of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 497 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (citations and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436; 
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334.  
 96. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 97. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); Sea 
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1437-38; 
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334-36. 
 98. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)). 
 99. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1401-45 (2000)). 
 100. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1437-38 (discussing Sea Clammers); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 335 
(same); Lisa L. Frye, Note, Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory Remedies Under Section 1983: 
Alteration Without Justification, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1181-82 (1993) (same); Michael A. 
Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1465, 1468 n.18 (1998) (same). 
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mains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed 
violations of federal law.”101  
 All three prongs of the Blessing test imply that any right at issue 
must ultimately derive from congressional intent as expressed in a 
statute. The Blessing standard does not specifically address the role 
that regulations may play in defining statutory rights. Two impor-
tant issues were left unresolved: (1) how explicitly must a statute 
create a right and (2) to what extent may a regulation help to define 
an implicit statutory right so that it is enforceable under § 1983? 
Part V.B examines whether the Court’s Gonzaga decision has clari-
fied these issues.102 
III.   THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER WHETHER FEDERAL 
REGULATORY RIGHTS ARE ENFORCEABLE UNDER § 1983 
 A key issue is whether the term “and laws” in § 1983 includes not 
only federal statutory rights but also “rights” contained in federal 
agency regulations. In his 1983 Guardians dissent, Justice Stevens 
argued that Thiboutot’s holding that “and laws” includes federal 
statutory rights “applies equally to administrative regulations hav-
ing the force of law.”103 When he used the term “regulations having 
the force of law,” Justice Stevens was most probably referring to his 
majority opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, a 1979 decision that did 
not involve § 1983.104 In summary, the Chrysler Court held that  
regulations may have “the force and effect of law” if: (1) they are 
substantive rules affecting individual rights and obligations, and 
not merely interpretive rules or general policy statements; (2) 
Congress has granted “quasi-legislative” power to the agency; and 
(3) the agency has complied with applicable procedures such as the 
Administrative Procedure Act.105  
If regulations can ever create rights enforceable under § 1983, regu-
lations would have to meet these three requirements.106 Unfortu-
                                                                                                                    
 101. 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334. 
 102. See infra notes 234-54 and accompanying text. 
 103. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 638 n.6 (1983) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 104. 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 341 (discussing Justice 
Stevens’s reference in Guardians to regulations having “force of law” as referring to his 
earlier Chrysler decision); Pettys, supra note 1, at 72 (same). 
 105. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 341 (discussing Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-04, 
308, 312-15 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (d))); Pettys, supra note 1, at 72 (same); see also 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000). 
 106. See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“At least 
where Congress directs regulatory action, we believe that the substantive federal regula-
tions issued under Congress’ mandate constitute ‘laws’ within the meaning of section 
1983.”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347-48 (discussing District of Columbia Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Samuels that regulations having force of law are enforceable under § 
1983). 
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nately, the Court has never directly addressed whether Justice Ste-
vens’s analysis, that regulations having the force of law may estab-
lish rights enforceable through § 1983, is correct.107   
A.   Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
 In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Author-
ity,108 the Supreme Court considered both specific Department of 
Housing and Urban Redevelopment (HUD) regulations109 and more 
general statutory language in holding that low-income tenants in a 
municipal housing project could bring a § 1983 action against Roa-
noke’s public housing authority.110 The plaintiffs contended that the 
city’s housing authority violated the Brooke Amendment to the Hous-
ing Act of 1937,111 which set “a maximum percentage of income that 
public housing tenants should pay as rent.”112 The plaintiffs argued 
that the Roanoke Housing Authority violated the Brooke Amend-
ment by failing to include a reasonable amount for utility use in de-
termining a tenant’s rent, despite relevant HUD regulations defining 
the statutory term “rent” to include reasonable utility payments.113 
Justice White’s majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, agreed with the plaintiffs 
that courts should defer to HUD’s interpretation of the definition of 
rent in the statute.114 The Court stated that the Brooke Amendment 
and relevant HUD regulations established enforceable rights under § 
1983: 
[R]espondent asserts that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the 
interim regulations gave the tenants any specific or definable 
rights to utilities, that is, no enforceable rights within the meaning 
of § 1983. We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke 
Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, ten-
ants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent 
of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the 
                                                                                                                    
 107. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003); Da-
vant, supra note 1, at 613, 628. 
 108. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). 
 109. Id. at 419, 420 & n.3, 421 & n.4, 422. 
 110. See id. at 431-32; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-65 (dis-
cussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1, 
at 115-16 (same). 
 111. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419-21 & 420 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III)). 
 112. Id. at 419-22; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-65 (discuss-
ing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1, at 
115-16 (same). 
 113. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419-22; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1462 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, su-
pra note 1, at 115-16 (same). 
 114. Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-32; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1462 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, su-
pra note 1, at 115-16 (same). 
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individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is 
undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD interim regula-
tions . . . expressly required that a “reasonable” amount for utili-
ties be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to charge, an in-
terpretation to which HUD has adhered both before and after the 
adoption of the Brooke Amendment. HUD’s view is entitled to def-
erence as a valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the 
course of amending that provision has not disagreed with it.115 
 It is not clear whether the Court used the HUD regulations to just 
interpret the statutory language in the Brooke Amendment or relied 
on the regulations as providing additional rights beyond the statu-
tory rights.116 To some extent, the Court may have viewed the regula-
tions as helping to explicate the statutory rights Congress intended 
to provide to tenants such as the plaintiffs. The Court stated: 
The regulations . . . defining the statutory concept of “rent” as in-
cluding utilities, have the force of law . . . . In our view, the bene-
fits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific 
and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Pennhurst and § 
1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the com-
petence of the judiciary to enforce.117 
Additionally, in a footnote, the majority arguably implied that regu-
lations alone may create rights enforceable through § 1983 provided 
that the governing statute delegates broad authority to the imple-
menting agency to define rights implicit in the statute: “The dissent 
may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations 
gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility 
allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the stat-
ute.”118 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-30. 
 116. Compare Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-63 (stating that 
“the Court’s opinion did not clearly explain whether the HUD regulations simply defined a 
right already implicit in the statute’s definition of ‘rent,’ or whether the regulations alone 
created rights enforceable though [sic] § 1983”), and Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 
343-44 (“It is not clear whether the majority simply deferred to the HUD regulation as a 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘rent’ or held that the regulations them-
selves may establish a private cause of action under § 1983.”), with Spital, supra note 1, at 
115-16 & n.157 (suggesting that Wright primarily relied on congressional intent and the 
statutes in defining rights of tenants, although considering regulations to help understand 
congressional intent). 
 117. Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, 
supra note 1, at 1462-63 (discussing Wright); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157 (sug-
gesting that Wright used regulations to interpret congressional intent in statute). 
 118. Wright, 479 U.S. at 421 n.3; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1462-63 (suggesting that the footnote in Wright may have relied on regulations to create 
rights greater than those in the statute). But see Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157 
(suggesting that Wright used regulations to interpret congressional intent in the statute 
and not to create additional rights). 
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 Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Wright, which was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, argued 
that regulations alone may not establish enforceable rights under § 
1983 because only Congress, in a statute, may create such an indi-
vidual right.119 She observed that the majority’s opinion did not 
clearly articulate whether the HUD regulations created a right im-
plicit in the statutory definition of “rent” or whether the regulations’ 
definition of rent, which included utilities, by itself established a 
right enforceable by the plaintiffs under § 1983.120 While she dis-
agreed with the majority view that either the statute or regulations 
at issue created a clear right in favor of tenants, O’Connor was most 
concerned with the majority’s implication that regulations might es-
tablish rights enforceable under § 1983 despite the absence of any 
evidence in the statute that Congress intended to create an individ-
ual right on behalf of the tenants. She contended that in § 1983 
cases, courts should make the same initial inquiry as they do in im-
plied private right of action cases—that is, to determine whether 
Congress intended to establish an individual right in favor of a class 
including the plaintiff—because “[w]hether a federal statute confers 
substantive rights is not an issue unique to § 1983 actions. In implied 
right of action cases, the Court also has asked . . . whether ‘the stat-
ute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.’”121 Her emphasis 
in Wright on the need for evidence that Congress intended to create 
an individual right before it could be enforced under § 1983 antici-
pated the Gonzaga decision’s standard.122 She also argued that the 
congressional intent analysis in implied private right of action cases 
was also the “key to the inquiry” in applying the Sea Clammers test 
for deciding whether a statute’s remedial scheme is so comprehensive 
that it precludes an action under § 1983.123 Even assuming arguendo 
that the HUD regulations in the case established definite rights in 
favor of the plaintiffs,124 she contended that these rights were not en-
                                                                                                                    
 119. Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33, 437-38, 441 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Key, supra note 
45, at 331; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463-64; Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 344. 
 120. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After 
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-63; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 343-44; Pettys, 
supra note 1, at 74-75. 
 121. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463; see also Mank, 
Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344. But see Key, supra note 45, at 332-33 (arguing that 
Justice O’Connor incorrectly relied on implied right of action cases because “§ 1983 itself 
explicitly authorizes private causes of action”). 
 122. See Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463. 
 123. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)); Mank, The 
Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344. 
 124. Justice O’Connor contended, however, that the HUD regulations at issue were too 
ambiguous in defining the crucial term “reasonable” rent to create valid tenant rights suit-
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forceable under § 1983 because the Brooke Amendment did not dem-
onstrate that “Congress intended to create a statutory entitlement to 
reasonable utilities.”125 Justice O’Connor stated: 
I am concerned, however, that lurking behind the Court’s analysis 
may be the view that, once it has been found that a statute creates 
some enforceable right, any regulation adopted within the purview 
of the statute creates rights enforceable in federal courts, regard-
less of whether Congress or the promulgating agency ever contem-
plated such a result. . . . Such a result, where determination of § 
1983 “rights” has been unleashed from any connection to congres-
sional intent, is troubling indeed.126 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not elucidated whether or 
when regulations may establish or help define individual rights en-
forceable through § 1983.127 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,128 
the Supreme Court considered implementing regulations and con-
cluded that a statutory mandate requiring states to adopt “reason-
able and adequate” reimbursement procedures for Medicaid costs 
was sufficiently clear to be enforceable by beneficiaries against 
states.129 The Court stated: “As in Wright, the statute and regulation 
set out factors which a State must consider in adopting its rates.”130 
The Wilder decision did not explain whether the right at issue in the 
case was created by the statute alone or the regulations as well.131 
However, the Wilder decision appeared to ground the right primarily 
in the statutory language and to consider the regulations only as a 
secondary factor.132 In Suter v. Artist M.,133 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
                                                                                                                    
able for judicial enforcement. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438-40 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463 n.317; Mank, Using § 1983, supra 
note 1, at 345 & n.178 (citing Wright); Pettys, supra note 1, at 75. 
 125. Wright, 479 U.S. at 434-37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After 
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463-64; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344. 
 126. Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 128. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 129. Id. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 130. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 131. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 132. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-21 (stating that the statute at issue “provides, if anything, 
more guidance than the provision at issue in Wright”); Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 
283 F.3d 531, 536-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that the Wilder decision paid 
more attention to the statute than the regulations at issue); Mank, Using § 1983, supra 
note 1, at 346 & n.187 (arguing that because the Wilder Court relied so heavily on the 
statute, “Wright remains the Supreme Court’s most direct and important use of regula-
tions to create enforceable rights under § 1983”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1464 (same). But cf. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (“The opinions in 
both Wright and Wilder took pains to analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in light of 
the entire legislative enactment . . . .”); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157 (suggesting 
that Wright primarily relied on congressional intent and the statutes in defining the rights 
of tenants, although considering regulations to help understand congressional intent). 
 133. 503 U.S. 347.  
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considered both the statute and the relevant Health and Human 
Services (HHS) regulations in determining whether they provided 
notice to the state that the plan it submitted to the federal agency, in 
order to receive federal funds, established enforceable rights on be-
half of the beneficiaries.134 The Court ultimately concluded that the 
regulations did not furnish clear notice to states that beneficiary 
parents could sue a state that did not comply with conditions in its 
plan, but the Suter decision did find the regulations to be relevant in 
determining the scope of the rights enforceable under § 1983.135 
B.   The Split in the Circuits Since Wright 
 There has been controversy over the meaning of Wright and espe-
cially over whether the Supreme Court indicated that a regulation 
alone could be enforceable through § 1983. Lower courts have dis-
agreed over whether Wright implied that a regulation alone could be 
enforceable through § 1983.136 Based on a broad reading of Thibou-
tot’s reference to “laws” and of Wright’s use of HUD regulations to 
find a right to fair rent, both the Sixth and the District of Columbia 
Circuits have held that an agency regulation can create an individual 
federal right.137 In 1985, before the Court decided Wright, the District 
of Columbia Circuit in Samuels, citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,138 
stated that valid federal regulations would create a right enforceable 
under § 1983, at least where the regulation was issued by the agency 
pursuant to an explicit congressional requirement: 
While Thiboutot involved a statutory violation, the Court’s broad 
analysis of the “laws” clause of section 1983 indicates that section 
1983 provides a legal remedy for the violation of all valid federal 
laws, including at least those federal regulations adopted pursuant 
to a clear congressional mandate that have the full force and effect 
of law. Such regulations have long been recognized as part of the 
body of federal law, see, e.g., Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03 . . . and 
                                                                                                                    
 134. See id. at 362-63; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464-65. 
 135. Suter, 503 U.S. at 359-63 (analyzing both the statute and regulations in conclud-
ing that neither created specific and enforceable right on behalf of parents); Mank, The Fu-
ture After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1443-44, 1464-65 (discussing Suter). But cf. Key, supra 
note 45, at 339-45 (critiquing the Suter Court’s rationale). 
 136. See Ceaser v. Pataki, No. 98 CIV.8532 (LMM), 2002 WL 472271, at *2-*3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (discussing disagreement by courts over whether Wright allows § 
1983 claims based on regulations alone or only where “regulation is linked to the federal 
statues [sic] authorizing it”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-46 (discussing con-
flicting interpretations of whether Wright allows regulation alone to establish right en-
forceable through § 1983); Bradford C. Mank, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate 
Impact Suits?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10454, 10475-76 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, South Cam-
den] (same). 
 137. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1994); Samuels v. 
District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 138. 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979). 
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Thiboutot expressly held that Congress did not intend to limit sec-
tion 1983 to some subset of federal laws.139 
Citing Wright, the Sixth Circuit in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn de-
clared: “As federal regulations have the force of law, they likewise 
may create enforceable rights.”140 The Sixth Circuit’s broad language 
arguably implied that any valid federal regulations alone may create 
rights that are enforceable under § 1983.141 The Samuels decision 
more carefully and appropriately suggested that an agency regula-
tion may create rights only if Congress has delegated to the agency 
the authority to issue rules having the force of law. After Sandoval 
and Gonzaga, the Sixth Circuit’s language is too broad, but the 
Samuels approach is still valid. Part VI.B demonstrates the validity 
of the Samuels approach by analyzing the First Circuit’s decision in 
Romney.142 
 The Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, and 
now the Ninth Circuit have narrowly interpreted Wright as enforcing 
only statutory rights and relying on the HUD regulations only to in-
terpret statutory rights.143 According to these courts, Wright did not 
rely on the HUD regulations to create independent rights enforceable 
through § 1983.144 For instance, in Harris v. James,145 the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded “that the Wright majority did not hold that federal 
rights are created either by regulations ‘alone’ or by any valid admin-
istrative interpretation of a statute creating some enforceable 
                                                                                                                    
 139. Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199 (“At least where Congress directs regulatory action, we 
believe that the substantive federal regulations issued under Congress’ mandate constitute 
‘laws’ within the meaning of section 1983.”); see also DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas 
Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 724 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Samuels and stating in dicta 
that “[i]n at least some instances, violations of rights provided under federal regulations 
provide a basis for § 1983 suits”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347-48 (discussing 
Samuels, Chrysler Corp., and De Vargas). But see S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 783-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing that prior cases, includ-
ing Samuels, did not hold that regulations alone may create rights enforceable through § 
1983). The Supreme Court first used the “force and effect of law” test in Chrysler Corp., 
441 U.S. at 301-03, to give greater deference to agency regulations that are issued pursu-
ant to an explicit congressional mandate. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1460-61 & n.298. 
 140. Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551. 
 141. Id. at 548; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1460 & n.297 (citing 
and discussing Loschiavo); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347 (same). 
 142. See infra notes 303-39 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939-43 (9th Cir. 2003); South 
Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90 (interpreting Wright as deciding that the regulation “merely 
defined the specific right that Congress already had conferred through the statute”); Har-
ris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 348-53 (discussing Harris). 
 144. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939-43; South Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90; Har-
ris, 127 F.3d at 1008; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using 
§ 1983, supra note 1, at 348-53 (discussing Harris). 
 145. 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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right.”146 Courts concluding that regulations may not establish rights 
enforceable under § 1983 have usually argued that Congress alone 
has the constitutional legislative power to create individually en-
forceable rights through the constitutionally prescribed process of 
enacting statutes.147 According to these courts, the key question is 
whether Congress intended to create an individual right in the stat-
ute.148 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that regulations 
may not independently establish rights under § 1983, but may only 
further define or flesh out rights established by Congress in the un-
derlying statute.149  
 Relying on Supreme Court decisions requiring congressional in-
tent to create an implied right of action, the Eleventh Circuit, in 
Harris, determined that congressional intent was also crucial in de-
termining whether a right was enforceable under § 1983:   
 In our view, the driving force behind the Supreme Court’s case 
law in this area is a requirement that courts find a Congressional 
intent to create a particular federal right. . . . In light of this focus 
[on congressional intent], we reject the Sixth Circuit’s approach—
i.e., finding a “federal right” in any regulation that in its own right 
meets the three-prong “federal rights” test. For the same reason, 
we also reject the approach labeled “troubling” by the dissent in 
Wright—i.e., finding enforceable rights in any valid administrative 
interpretation of a statute that creates some enforceable right.150 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “federal rights must ultimately 
emanate from either explicit or implicit statutory requirements.”151 A 
regulation may serve as the basis of a § 1983 suit only if there is an 
appropriate “nexus” between the right in the regulation and congres-
sional intent to establish an enforceable federal right in the statute 
that authorized the regulation. Similarly, the Third Circuit, in South 
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection,152 agreed with the Harris court that regulations 
alone may not establish enforceable rights and interpreted Wright as 
allowing plaintiffs to use § 1983 to enforce only those rights that 
Congress has explicitly included in a statute: 
                                                                                                                    
 146. Id. at 1008. 
 147. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1007-08. 
 148. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] refined its analysis 
to focus directly on Congress’ intent to create enforceable rights and to confine its holdings 
to the limits of that intent.”); Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09. 
 149. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998); Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09; 
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, 
at 348-53 (discussing Doe and Harris). 
 150. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008 (citation omitted); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 
348-49. 
 151. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009 n.21. 
 152. 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 Clearly, therefore, the regulation at issue in Wright merely de-
fined the specific right that Congress already had conferred 
through the statute. There should be no doubt on this point, for the 
Court plainly stated that “the benefits Congress intended to confer 
on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as en-
forceable rights under . . . § 1983, rights that are not, as respon-
dent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.” 
Therefore, the Wright Court located the alleged right in the statu-
tory provision and then relied upon the implementing regulations 
to define and interpret that right.153 
Both Harris and South Camden applied an “unambiguous” evidence-
of-congressional-intent standard similar to the one that the Supreme 
Court later adopted in Gonzaga.154  
IV.   UNDER THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONGRESS HAS THE 
PRIMARY ROLE IN CREATING ENFORCEABLE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, BUT 
AGENCIES CAN PLAY SOME ROLE IN DEFINING THE DETAILS OF THESE 
RIGHTS 
 Davant contends that fundamental separation of powers princi-
ples give Congress the sole authority to create individual rights that 
are enforceable under § 1983.155 Even if it has the ultimate legislative 
authority to establish individual rights, however, Congress may dele-
gate some authority for defining such rights to administrative agen-
cies.156 If the delegation of legislative authority is sufficiently clear, 
agencies may play a role in defining a right generally but incom-
pletely defined by Congress.157   
                                                                                                                    
 153. Id. at 783 (citations omitted). 
 154. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (“We now reject the notion 
that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a 
cause of action brought under § 1983.”); id. at 290 (“In sum, if Congress wishes to create 
new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no 
less and no more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under 
an implied private right of action.”); South Camden, 274 F.3d at 786-87 (concluding that 
because the regulations at issue went “beyond explicating the specific content of the statu-
tory provision,” they did not confer a “‘federal right’ enforceable under § 1983” because “[t]o 
hold otherwise would be inconsistent . . . with the Supreme Court’s directive that courts 
must find that Congress has unambiguously conferred federal rights on the plaintiff”); 
Harris, 127 F.3d at 1011-12 (stating that test for § 1983 suits was whether there was evi-
dence in the statute that Congress had “unambiguously conferred” upon Medicaid recipi-
ents a federal right to transportation enforceable under § 1983); Mank, The Future After 
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1446, 1466 & nn.336-38 (discussing and criticizing unambiguous 
evidence standard for § 1983 suits); infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Davant, supra note 1, at 615-16, 633-41, 645-48. 
 156. See infra notes 168-79, 182, 186-93 and accompanying text. 
 157. See infra notes 169-79, 186, 192-93, 197-98, 252 and accompanying text. 
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A.   The Primacy of the Legislative Role 
1.   The Separation of Powers 
 In INS v. Chadha,158 the Supreme Court articulated a fairly rigid 
demarcation of the powers of the three branches of government: “The 
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Fed-
eral Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Execu-
tive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch 
of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility.”159 
Although it recognized that the three branches are “not ‘hermetically’ 
sealed from one another,” the Chadha Court concluded that “the 
powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifi-
able.”160 Subsequently, however, the Court has sometimes adopted a 
less rigid approach to the separation of powers and acknowledged 
some overlapping functions among the three branches, especially in 
Mistretta v. United States,161 which involved an unsuccessful chal-
lenge to the United States Sentencing Commission. The Mistretta 
Court held that Congress had not violated the separation of powers 
by placing the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch, by 
delegating to the judicial branch nonadjudicatory rulemaking func-
tions with the aim of helping Congress to establish determinate sen-
tences, by requiring active Article III federal judges to serve as com-
missioners along with non-judges, or by giving the President the 
power to appoint all Commission members and remove them “for 
cause” because none of these functions interfered with core judicial 
functions and because sentencing involves shared functions within 
the three branches.162 The Mistretta decision recognized that there 
could be some overlapping of functions among the three branches as 
long as no single branch exercised control over another: 
Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon 
the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of in-
terdependence as well as independence . . . . 
 . . . .  
 In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, 
we simply have recognized Madison’s teaching that the greatest 
security against tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority 
in a single Branch—lies not in a hermetic division among the 
                                                                                                                    
 158. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
 159. Id. at 951; see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our system of govern-
ment is . . . a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to 
it by the Constitution.”).  
 160. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
 161. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 162. See id. at 383-412. 
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Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and bal-
anced power within each Branch.163 
 The Constitution grants the legislative power only to Congress. 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress . . . which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”164 In the steel sei-
zure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the term “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Article I to 
indicate that “[t]he Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking 
power to the Congress alone.”165 In TVA v. Hill,166 the Supreme Court 
concluded:  
[I]t is . . . emphatically . . . the exclusive province of the Congress 
not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs 
and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Na-
tion. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided 
the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to ad-
minister the laws and for the courts to enforce them when en-
forcement is sought.167 
2.   Delegation 
 To understand the issue whether and when regulations may cre-
ate rights enforceable under § 1983, one must understand the con-
cept of legislative delegation of authority to executive agencies. To 
prevent the executive branch from arrogating the legislative func-
tion, the nondelegation doctrine, which is based on Article I, Section 
7 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, pro-
hibits Congress from delegating essential legislative decisions to the 
agencies.168 However, courts have liberally construed the nondelega-
tion doctrine to allow Congress to delegate authority to an agency as 
long as a statute delegating authority to an agency contains an “in-
telligible principle” that defines the scope of agency authority, includ-
ing its power to issue regulations.169 In Mistretta,170 the Court upheld 
                                                                                                                    
 163. Id. at 381. 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 165. 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952). 
 166. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 167. Id. at 194. 
 168. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I, § 1, of 
the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the 
United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers . . . .”); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (“Congress is not permitted to ab-
dicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is . . . 
vested.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-76 (finding intelligible principle in Clean Air 
Act’s “adequate margin of safety” standard for setting ambient air quality standards); J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (announcing “intelligible 
principle” standard for reviewing delegation of legislative authority and upholding delega-
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congressional authority to delegate extensive quasi-legislative pow-
ers to a federal Sentencing Commission that has the discretionary 
authority to establish determinate criminal sentences for a wide 
range of federal offenses as long as the sentences are within the typi-
cally broad range initially established by Congress. The Court also 
stated that “this Court has deemed it constitutionally sufficient if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency 
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated author-
ity.”171 The Supreme Court has invalidated a statute for lack of an 
“intelligible principle” only two times—both in 1935.172 Because mod-
ern courts have often treated the nondelegation doctrine as mere 
window dressing lacking any real substance,173 a number of commen-
tators have argued for its reinvigoration, but so far to no avail.174  
 Although modern courts have not strictly applied the nondelega-
tion doctrine, courts have required agency actions to be based on a 
reasonable construction of the statute authorizing the agency to act. 
Thus, a regulation is valid only if a statute authorizes the agency to 
issue it.175 For instance, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,176 the Su-
                                                                                                                    
tion to Executive Branch of authority to revise tariff duties); Mank, Using § 1983, supra 
note 1, at 339-40; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private 
Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 8, 20-21 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).  
 170. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 171. Id. at 372-73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competi-
tion to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1459 n.53 (2003); Sunstein, supra 
note 169, at 322. Since 1935, the Court has never struck down a statute as an excessive 
delegation of legislative authority. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-76 (holding that the 
Clean Air Act’s delegation of ambient air quality standards to EPA is constitutional and 
observing that the Court has not invalidated a statute as lacking an “intelligible principle” 
since 1935); DeShazo & Freeman, supra, at 1459 n.53 (“[N]ot once since the 1930s, has the 
Supreme Court found a delegation to be so utterly without an ‘intelligible principle’ to 
guide the exercise of discretion that it violates the nondelegation doctrine.”); Richard B. 
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 326 n.20 (1987) (“The year 
1937 signalled the end of the brief Schechter era during which the Court invoked the dele-
gation doctrine to invalidate broad delegations of power.”). 
 173. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (Berzon, 
J., dissenting in part) (“Thus, while it is indisputably true that Congress may not delegate 
its legislative power to administrative agencies, in practice this limitation operates to pro-
hibit only the broadest of delegations.”). 
 174. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993) (arguing for revival of nondelega-
tion doctrine); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
131-34 (1980) (same); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism 
and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 296-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987) (same). 
 175. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (stating that “the exercise 
of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in 
a grant of such power by the Congress”); Oceanair of Fla., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of 
Transp., 876 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (“An administrative agency . . . is a creature 
of Congress and has no authority beyond that granted by Congress.”); Mank, Using § 1983, 
supra note 1, at 339; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
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preme Court stated: “The rulemaking power granted to an adminis-
trative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is 
not the power to make law. Rather, it is ‘the power to adopt regula-
tions to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the 
statute.’”177 If a regulation is inconsistent with the authorizing stat-
ute’s authority, then the invalid regulation could not create any valid 
rights or cause of action.178 Furthermore, an agency must issue regu-
lations that are a reasonable interpretation of a statute, or in other 
words, not arbitrary and capricious in substance.179 
B.   Chevron and the Realities of the Administrative State: Agencies 
Have the Primary Role in Interpreting Ambiguous Statutes when 
Congress Delegates Such Authority to Them 
 Because of judicial acquiescence to legislative delegation,180 Con-
gress has frequently enacted statutes that establish broad goals and 
then delegate extensive authority to an executive agency to deter-
mine how to achieve those goals.181 Courts usually allow Congress to 
delegate substantial authority to agencies provided that an enabling 
statute includes basic governing principles.182 Because statutes often 
contain broad goals or delegate considerable authority to an 
agency,183 agencies often promulgate regulations to interpret and 
help define rights that are only implicit or generally defined in the 
enabling statute.184 Although agencies may not exercise full legisla-
                                                                                                                    
HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (describing faithful agent theory, which maintains that 
courts use judicial review as a method to insure that agency behavior is faithful to statu-
tory mandates).  
 176. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 177. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. See Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 339-40; Pierce, supra note 169, at 1-2, 8, 
20-21. 
 179. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
34 (1983). 
 180. See infra notes 182, 185 and accompanying text. 
 181. SCHOENBROD, supra note 174, at 3-21 (acknowledging frequency of legislative 
delegations, but arguing that broad delegations of legislative power to agencies de-
legitimize representative governance); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1444 
(“When passing legislation, Congress routinely delegates considerable discretionary au-
thority to administrative agencies.”); id. at 1452-54; Thomas O. Sargentich, The Delegation 
Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 (1987) 
(discussing frequent practice of legislative delegation). 
 182. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: 
A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (discussing debate regarding 
legitimacy of congressional delegation of legislative authority to agencies and reporting 
that courts have almost invariably approved such delegations). 
 183. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1452-53 (“Hundreds of federal statutes 
delegate powers, many sweeping, to administrative agencies.”); infra notes 186-91, 289 and 
accompanying text. 
 184. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1453-54 (“In practical terms, agencies fre-
quently determine the extent to which a law will be binding, and upon whom.”).  
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tive authority, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that agency 
rulemaking resembles lawmaking and is sometimes quasi-legislative 
in nature.185  
 If a statute is silent or ambiguous about the particular issue in 
question, the Supreme Court in its 1984 Chevron decision186 estab-
lished the principle that courts should defer to an agency’s reason-
able interpretation of that statute, including filling in “gaps” in the 
statute, both because agencies usually possess greater substantive 
expertise than courts and because the executive branch is politically 
accountable.187 Before Chevron, the Court had usually deferred to an 
agency interpretation of a statute only where Congress had expressly 
delegated authority to an agency “to define a statutory term or pre-
scribe a method of executing a statutory provision.”188 Conversely, if a 
statute’s language is clear and specific, a court must reject an agency 
interpretation that is contrary to that language.189 
 The Chevron decision specifically states that Congress may dele-
gate quasi-legislative authority to agencies to fill “gaps” in a stat-
ute.190 “The power of an administrative agency to administer a con-
gressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formula-
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.”191 Chevron suggests that in filling such gaps 
an agency could, in some circumstances, reasonably clarify or amplify 
                                                                                                                    
 185. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (“To be sure, some administra-
tive agency action—rulemaking, for example—may resemble ‘lawmaking.’ . . . This Court 
has referred to agency activity as being ‘quasi-legislative’ in character. . . . [But w]hen the 
Attorney General performs his duties . . . he does not exercise ‘legislative’ power.” (citations 
omitted)); Davant, supra note 1, at 641-42 (conceding existence of “quasi-legislative author-
ity” in agencies). 
 186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 187. Id. at 842-44 (stating that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of am-
biguous statutory language or of filling in a “gap” in a silent statute if the interpretation is 
reasonable); id. at 865-66 (stressing that executive agencies have a more appropriate role 
in defining ambiguous statutory language because they possess greater substantive exper-
tise than courts and because agencies are politically accountable through elections, unlike 
courts); Manning, supra note 21, at 625-26 (describing the presumption established in 
Chevron that silence in a statute shows the intent of Congress to leave the act of interpre-
tation in the hands of the agency in charge of administering the act); supra note 21 and ac-
companying text; infra notes 188-93, 289 and accompanying text.  
 188. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting Rowan 
Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 21, at 833 & n.2 (2001) (citing cases). 
 189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 190. See id. at 843-44; Manning, supra note 21, at 625-26; Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 21, at 833-34, passim (explaining that Chevron fundamentally expanded the courts’ 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes by presuming that gaps or ambiguities in a 
statute reflected implicit congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to an 
agency). 
 191. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Davant, supra note 1, at 642. 
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rights that are only inchoate or implicit in an ambiguous statute or 
one that contains obvious gaps.192 The Court wrote:  
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a spe-
cific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regula-
tions are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legisla-
tive delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit 
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpre-
tation made by the administrator of an agency.193  
Some commentators have argued that courts should not apply Chev-
ron deference where a statute is silent because such legislative si-
lence does not necessarily reflect congressional intent to delegate 
omitted issues to the discretion of agency interpretation and may in 
fact reflect a conscious congressional intent not to delegate authority 
to an agency; but the Chevron presumption remains good law.194  
 Courts and commentators have recognized that Chevron’s pre-
sumption that agencies may issue rules to fill gaps in ambiguous 
statutes requires courts to give considerable deference to agency 
regulations interpreting a statute. For example, the First Circuit has 
held that “[a]n inquiring court—even a court empowered to conduct 
de novo review—must examine the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
statute, as expressed in the regulation, through a deferential 
glass.”195 Although generally opposed to the idea of agencies defining 
rights enforceable under § 1983, Davant acknowledges that Chev-
ron’s gap-filling, or implicit delegation, doctrine suggests that agen-
cies may at least sometimes define rights in ambiguous statutes, in-
cluding filling a “gap” in a silent statute, that in turn could be en-
forced through § 1983.196 
 Arguably, however, the Chevron deference doctrine is limited to 
regulations that merely interpret a statutory right and does not ap-
ply to regulations that create or “effectuate” rights based on the gen-
                                                                                                                    
 192. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 833-34, 
passim. 
 193. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnote omitted); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, 
at 833-34, passim.  
 194. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 844-45 (contending that congres-
sional silence should be assumed to reflect an intent to withhold Chevron deference when 
the legal question at issue is “extraordinary”). 
 195. Strickland v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 196. Davant, supra note 1, at 642-44 (conceding that the Chevron doctrine suggests 
agencies could in certain circumstances fill a statutory gap by defining a right enforceable 
through § 1983, but arguing that courts should be very cautious in doing so unless the 
statute very explicitly delegates authority to define rights to an agency). 
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eral goals of a statute.197 Although the Court’s opinion is not com-
pletely clear on this point, a narrow view of the Chevron doctrine is 
that the deference principle applies to agency interpretations of 
statutory rights but arguably not to agency regulations that go be-
yond a statute to effectuate the statute’s general goals.198 In light of 
Sandoval’s insistence that regulations may only interpret rights, but 
not create them,199 the narrower view of the Chevron deference doc-
trine is more defensible today.  
C.   Recent Chevron Cases: A Recent Trend Toward Less Deference? 
 Some recent Court decisions have arguably narrowed the Chevron 
doctrine—that agencies may fill gaps in statutes—by refusing to de-
fer to agency interpretations of statutory rights that are not con-
tained in a rule, but instead are issued by the agency in a less formal 
interpretive statement that is not promulgated with the opportunity 
for public notice and comment.200 For example, in United States v. 
Mead Corp.,201 the Court narrowed the application of the Chevron 
deference doctrine by holding that such deference applies only where 
“it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally 
to make rules carrying the force of law” and that if an agency issues 
an interpretation of a statute without following the public notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures utilized in Chevron, then 
courts should apply the less deferential Skidmore standard.202 In 
                                                                                                                    
 197. See Brianne J. Gorod, Case Comment, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chev-
ron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of Action, 113 YALE L.J. 939, 943, 945-46 
nn.40-42 (2004). 
 198. Id. at 946 & n.42. 
 199. See supra notes 24-25, 28, 37 and accompanying text; infra notes 213-16, 222, 224-
27 and accompanying text. 
 200. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001); Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) 
(rejecting agency interpretation issued without public notice and comment in preamble to 
rule); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (limiting Chevron defer-
ence to agency actions that have the “force of law”); Davant, supra note 1, at 645-46; Derek 
P. Langhauser, Executive Regulations and Agency Interpretations: Binding Law or Mere 
Guidance? Developments in Federal Judicial Review, 29 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3 (2002). 
 201. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 202. See id. at 226-30; Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the 
Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 677-81 (2002) (discuss-
ing Mead); Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the Chev-
ron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 699-702, 707-10 (2002) (same); 
Langhauser, supra note 200, at 3, 14-18 (same); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury 
in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over 
Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1328-36 (2002) (same). A year before 
Mead, the Court, in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000), had also 
limited Chevron deference to agency actions that have the “force of law,” but the majority’s 
opinion did not clearly delineate the line between interpretations entitled to Chevron def-
erence and those only entitled to Skidmore deference. See Howarth, supra, at 714-17; 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 846-47; Molot, supra, at 1334-35. Thus, Mead is 
likely to have more impact than Christensen. 
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1944, the Court, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,203 stated that where 
Congress has not expressly delegated interpretive authority to an 
agency, courts should give only limited deference to agency interpre-
tations, depending upon the persuasiveness of that interpretation 
and the agency’s degree of expertise.204 The Mead decision is broader 
than Skidmore concerning what type of proof might be sufficient to 
demonstrate that Congress delegated authority to an agency: “Dele-
gation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congres-
sional intent.”205 The Mead decision and some other recent Court de-
cisions suggest a switch by the Court from an expansive Chevron 
deference to agency statutory interpretations toward a more critical 
inquiry of agency action under the Skidmore doctrine.206 In some 
cases, the Court has even refused to defer to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statute promulgated in a rule if the Court be-
lieves the interpretation, nonetheless, is unreasonable and contrary 
to congressional intent.207  
 A recent 2004 decision, Alaska Department of Environmental Pro-
tection v. EPA,208 however, may portend that the Court is returning 
to a more deferential position.209 In Alaska Department of Environ-
                                                                                                                    
 203. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 204. Id. at 137-40; Howarth, supra note 202, at 713-16 (discussing differences between 
Skidmore and Chevron deference doctrines); Langhauser, supra note 200, at 11-14 (same); 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 853-56 (same). 
 205. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 206. See id. at 226-30 (concluding that Chevron deference does not apply to an agency 
interpretation contained in informal interpretive documents lacking rulemaking status); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (rejecting agency interpretation issued without public notice and com-
ment in preamble to rule); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. at 586-88 (2002) (limit-
ing Chevron deference to agency actions that have the “force of law”); Langhauser, supra 
note 200, at 3, 14-18 (discussing Mead’s use of Skidmore deference and the implications for 
limiting Chevron); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 856-58 (discussing Supreme Court 
cases using the Skidmore deference doctrine and implications for limiting Chevron); Molot, 
supra note 202, at 1328-36 (discussing Mead); see also supra notes 200-05 and accompany-
ing text; infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481-86 (2001) (invalidating an 
Environmental Protection Agency regulation interpreting an ambiguous statute because 
the interpretation was unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent); FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (concluding that normal Chevron 
deference to agency interpretation did not apply because of “extraordinary” circumstances 
suggesting Congress did not want the agency to regulate tobacco); Healy, supra note 202, 
at 684-86 (discussing the Whitman Court’s conclusion that agency interpretation of an am-
biguous statute was not entitled to deference under Chevron); Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 21, at 844-45 (discussing the Brown & Williamson Court’s refusal to apply Chevron 
deference and the implications for future cases); Molot, supra note 202, at 1324-28 (criticiz-
ing the Brown & Williamson Court’s use of vague “extraordinary” exception to Chevron 
doctrine and discussing whether the case portends a narrower application of Chevron). 
 208. 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 209. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
876  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:843 
 
mental Protection, the Court deferred to the agency interpretation of 
the Act’s “best available control technology” (BACT) provisions even 
though the agency had only issued internal guidance that was not 
entitled to Chevron deference, which applies only to valid and duly 
promulgated rules published after notice and comment.210 In his dis-
senting opinion in Alaska Department of Environmental Protection, 
Justice Kennedy complained that while the majority had technically 
rejected Chevron deference because the EPA had not issued a quali-
fying regulation, the Court had applied a de facto similar standard.211 
Despite Mead, the Court still follows the Chevron deference principle 
that courts should defer to a “reasonable” agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous or silent statute, at least in cases in which agencies 
promulgate their interpretation in a rule issued through notice-and-
comment rulemaking and, in Alaska Department of Environmental 
Protection, even in a case in which the agency did not utilize rule-
making.212 
V.   THE IMPACT OF SANDOVAL AND GONZAGA: CONGRESS MUST 
ESTABLISH ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS 
A.   Sandoval: Only Congress Can Create a Private Right of Action 
 In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval,213 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that only Congress may create rights that are enforceable in a 
private right of action and that agency regulations purporting to es-
tablish broader rights are not enforceable as a private right of action 
in federal court. In Sandoval, the plaintiffs claimed that a private 
right of action was established through agency regulations prohibit-
ing recipients of federal funds, including state agencies, from engag-
ing in actions that cause disparate impacts to minority groups.214 The 
Court had interpreted Title VI’s statutory language to prohibit only 
intentional discrimination and not to prohibit disparate impact dis-
crimination so that any right of action against disparate impact dis-
crimination could only arise from the regulations.215 The plaintiffs 
contended that the Alabama Department of Public Safety’s policy of 
administering its driver’s license examination only in English estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in viola-
tion of the relevant Section 602 regulations.216 
                                                                                                                    
 210. 540 U.S. at 487-93 (holding that agency interpretation in several internal guid-
ance documents is entitled to deference even though Chevron doctrine does not apply). 
 211. Id. at 517-18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 212. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
 213. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 214. See id. at 278-79. 
 215. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79. 
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 In determining whether Section 602 disparate impact regulations 
establish a private right of action, the Sandoval Court used its post-
Cort principle that “private rights of action to enforce federal law 
must be created by Congress.”217 In determining statutory intent, the 
Sandoval Court refused to consider whether a private right of action 
would serve Title VI’s purposes or even whether the Congress that 
enacted the statute in 1964 assumed that courts would imply a pri-
vate right of action. The Sandoval Court observed that since its 1975 
decision in Cort v. Ash,218 the Court had consistently rejected the 
view in its 1964 decision J.I. Case Co. v. Borak219 that “‘it is the duty 
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to 
make effective the congressional purpose’ expressed by a statute,” 
even when the Court reviewed statutes enacted before the Cort deci-
sion.220 Rejecting the respondents’ argument that it should apply Bo-
rak’s approach to a statute enacted just after that decision, the 
Sandoval Court declared: “Having sworn off the habit of venturing 
beyond Congress’s intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation 
to have one last drink.”221   
 The Court focused on the text of Section 602 in deciding whether 
Congress intended to create an enforceable private right of action to 
enforce regulations promulgated under Section 602. Applying a tex-
tualist approach to statutory interpretation, the Court observed: 
“The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to 
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private 
right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point 
is determinative.”222 The Sandoval Court concluded that “[w]e there-
fore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent 
with the text and structure of Title VI.”223 The Court’s focus on the 
statute’s text in determining whether the statute established a pri-
vate right of action led it to reject the respondents’ argument that 
rights might arise from agency regulations.224 The Court announced: 
“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that 
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right 
that Congress has not.”225 The Court emphasized that regulations 
alone may not create individual rights, stating that “it is most cer-
                                                                                                                    
 217. Id. at 286. 
 218. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 219. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 220. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 433). 
 221. Id. at 287; Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevail-
ing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 859-60 (2002); Short, supra note 32, at 128. 
 222. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 223. Id. at 288; Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short, supra note 32, at 128-29. 
 224. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short, supra note 32, at 
129. 
 225. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short, 
supra note 32, at 129. 
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tainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a 
private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. 
Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer 
himself.”226 The Sandoval Court held that “[n]either as originally en-
acted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a 
freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promul-
gated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action ex-
ists.”227 
 However, the Sandoval decision acknowledged that plaintiffs 
could still bring a private right of action against recipients alleging 
that they had committed intentional discrimination in violation of ei-
ther Section 601 or “regulations applying [Section] 601’s ban on in-
tentional discrimination.”228 Citing Chevron, the Court stated that 
regulations, including those issued under Section 602, were enforce-
able to the extent that they effectuated the core prohibition against 
intentional discrimination in Section 601:  
We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban on inten-
tional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce 
that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authorita-
tively construe the statute itself . . . . A Congress that intends the 
statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the 
authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as 
well.229 
1.   Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion 
 In his dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the majority’s re-
fusal to defer to the agency’s Section 602 regulations was contrary to 
the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an agency’s 
appropriate interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term such as 
“discrimination.”230 Justice Stevens argued, “In most other contexts, 
when the agencies charged with administering a broadly worded 
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete 
guidance as to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of 
the statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreason-
                                                                                                                    
 226. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. 
 227. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted). 
 228. Id. at 284. 
 229. Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 
251, 257 (1995), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-44 (1984)). 
 230. Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron); Mank, supra note 32, at 530 
(arguing that the majority opinion in Sandoval ignored the Chevron deference principle); 
Short, supra note 32, at 133. 
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able construction of the statutory text.”231 Under Chevron, there is a 
good argument that courts should defer to agency interpretations of 
Title VI and Title IX because the term “discrimination” in these stat-
utes is ambiguous.232 Justice Stevens contended that the majority 
opinion might have little significance because even if there was no 
private right of action available to enforce Section 602 regulations, 
then a suit under § 1983 could enforce those same regulations indi-
rectly because the standard for enforcing federal rights under § 1983 
is broader than the standard for implying private rights of action.233  
B.   Gonzaga: Congress Must Create Rights Enforceable Through § 
1983 
 Before the Supreme Court’s Gonzaga decision, several decisions 
had allowed suits under § 1983 to vindicate federal statutory rights 
even when the underlying statute creating the right was not enforce-
able as a private right of action.234 The Gonzaga Court, however, con-
                                                                                                                    
 231. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron); Mank, supra 
note 32, at 530; Short, supra note 32, at 133. 
 232. See Black, supra note 1, at 361-62 (arguing that agency interpretations of Title VI 
deserve deference because agencies such as the Department of Education possess signifi-
cant experience and expertise in applying statute); Galalis, supra note 32, at 65, 92-98, 101 
(arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title 
VI’s Section 602 disparate impact regulations because they are entitled to deference under 
Chevron since the term “discrimination” in Section 602 is ambiguous and disparate impact 
regulations are a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Note, supra note 32, at 1781 
(same). 
 233. Justice Stevens stated: 
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely be-
cause they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI 
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to en-
force the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only 
reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case (or other 
similarly situated individuals) presumably retain the option of re-challenging 
Alabama’s English-only policy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after to-
day’s decision. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Mank, Using § 1983, 
supra note 1, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact regulations may be 
enforced through § 1983).  
 234. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990) (observing that 
whether a § 1983 suit is available presents a “different inquiry” than whether an implied 
right of action exists); Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1248-57 
(7th Cir. 1997) (determining that a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based on the Reha-
bilitation Act because it created an enforceable right and did not foreclose such relief but 
deciding that there was no private right of action under the act because its language and 
legislative history suggested that the statute’s administrative remedy was a more appro-
priate enforcement mechanism); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 102-06 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(concluding, under the Cort analysis, that the Housing and Community Development Act 
did not create a private right of action, but did, based on the Blessing/Wilder analysis, cre-
ate substantive rights which could be enforced through a § 1983 action); Fay v. S. Colonie 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that although the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) itself does not give rise to a private cause of ac-
tion, plaintiffs could nonetheless bring suit under § 1983 to enforce rights created by 
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cluded that individual rights enforceable through § 1983 and implied 
private rights of action are similar. “[W]e . . . reject the notion that 
our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our § 
1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied right of action cases should 
guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforce-
able under § 1983.”235 The Court continued:  
 We have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be 
enforced through § 1983 “is a different inquiry than that involved 
in determining whether a private right of action can be implied 
from a particular statute.” But the inquiries overlap in one mean-
ingful respect—in either case we must first determine whether 
Congress intended to create a federal right.236 
 Accordingly, the Gonzaga Court stated: “[I]mplied right of action 
cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers 
rights enforceable under § 1983.”237 The Gonzaga Court held that the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act did not establish indi-
vidual rights that could be enforced through § 1983 because Congress 
intended to give only the Department of Education, and not private 
individuals, the authority to bring suit against schools that violated 
the statute’s nondisclosure provisions.238 
 Although the Gonzaga decision has made the congressional intent 
test for implied rights of action the initial inquiry in § 1983 cases,239 
it is still possible to enforce a federal statutory right through § 1983 
even if that right cannot be enforced as a direct private right of ac-
                                                                                                                    
FERPA), overruled, Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2002) (overruling Fay in 
light of Gonzaga); Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass’n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 739 F.2d 
1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that plaintiffs could bring a § 1983 action be-
cause the statute at issue clearly mandated that the trust at issue be established for the 
benefit of Hawaiians such as plaintiffs and it did not foreclose a § 1983 remedy, but also 
concluding that no private right of action existed under the statute); Mank, The Future Af-
ter Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1438-42 & n.166; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 353-
59; Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1991). But see Mazzuchi, supra note 63, at 1064, 1093 (argu-
ing that statutory rights under § 1983 should be limited in the future to cases in which 
rights could be enforced through an implied or explicit private right of action, but acknowl-
edging that prior cases have applied a more lenient standard in § 1983 suits). 
 235. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, 
supra note 1, at 1446-51. 
 236. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9) (citation omitted); 
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1448. 
 237. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1448-51. 
 238. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287-91; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1450-52. Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent in Gonzaga, which was joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, in which he argued that the statute did seek to create rights on behalf of indi-
viduals. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 293-303 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After 
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1453-55, 1457-58. 
 239. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-86; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1448-51. 
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tion.240 Under the Gonzaga decision, for both suits asserting a private 
right of action and those proceeding under § 1983, a court first exam-
ines whether Congress intended, either expressly or by implication, 
to establish an individual federal right on behalf of a class including 
the plaintiff.241 After the initial Gonzaga inquiry about whether Con-
gress intended to establish a federal right, however, there is a differ-
ence in determining whether the remedies are available under a pri-
vate right of action and a § 1983 suit.242 Under a private right of ac-
tion, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that Congress intended to 
create a right on behalf of the plaintiff243 but also that Congress in-
tended that plaintiffs have the right to sue to enforce that right.244 By 
contrast, in § 1983 cases, under the Supreme Court’s three-part 
Blessing test, once a plaintiff shows that Congress intended to estab-
lish a right in favor of the plaintiff,245 there is a strong presumption 
that the plaintiff may enforce that right because § 1983 itself pro-
vides the remedy, unless the narrow Sea Clammers exception ap-
plies.246 Because § 1983 provides an “alternative source of express 
                                                                                                                    
 240. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute con-
fers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.”); Mank, The Fu-
ture After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1448-50, 1455-59, 1481-82 (arguing that Gonzaga 
changes initial inquiry in § 1983 suits, but not the presumption that federal rights are en-
forceable by § 1983). 
 241. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-86; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, 
at 1448-51. 
 242. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 
1455-59, 1481-82. 
 243. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate 
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can im-
prove upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.”); Mank, The Future Af-
ter Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right, supra note 63, at 31-32, 44-46 
(arguing that beginning in 1979 the Supreme Court made congressional intent the main 
factor in determining whether to imply a private right of action); Stabile, supra note 63, at 
868-71 (arguing that in 1979 the Supreme Court began “an exclusive reliance on legislative 
intent” in determining a private right of action). 
 244. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (stating that the plaintiff has the 
burden to demonstrate Congress’s intent to make a private remedy available); Wilder v. 
Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 19, 23-24 (1979) (“[W]hat must ultimately be determined is 
whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted . . . .”); Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 357-58 (stating that the plaintiff in a private right of action case 
must show that Congress intended the remedy to be available to the plaintiff). 
 245. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Mank, Using § 1983, supra 
note 1, at 332; supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute con-
fers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.”); Wilder, 496 
U.S. at 508 n.9 (stating Supreme Court has “recognize[d] an exception to the general rule 
that § 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal statutory rights only when Congress 
has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy”); id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that “§ 1983 generally . . . supplies the remedy for vindication of rights arising from 
federal statutes”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1439-41, 1448-50, 
1455-59, 1481-82 (arguing that Gonzaga changes the initial inquiry in § 1983 suits, but not 
the presumption in Wilder that federal rights are enforceable through § 1983); Mank, Us-
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congressional authorization of private suits,” the separation of pow-
ers concerns that require congressional intent to authorize remedies 
in a private cause of action are not present in a § 1983 case.247 Al-
though emphasizing that plaintiffs suing under § 1983 bear the same 
burden as plaintiffs in a private cause of action suit to show Congress 
intended to establish individually enforceable rights, the Gonzaga 
Court acknowledged the rule set forth in its earlier decisions that the 
plaintiff in the former type of suit does not have to prove that Con-
gress intended to provide individual remedies, stating:  
 Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing 
an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally sup-
plies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal stat-
utes. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an indi-
vidual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.248 
 Because the Court held in Sandoval that only Congress can create 
implied rights of action, the Gonzaga decision’s conclusion that only 
Congress may establish federal rights enforceable through § 1983 
implies that a regulation alone may not create a right enforceable 
through § 1983.249 The Gonzaga Court stated that rights are enforce-
able by individuals through § 1983 only where there is “clear” and 
“unambiguous” evidence that Congress intended to establish an indi-
vidual right.250 If an agency seeks to create a right in a regulation 
alone that is not at all in the underlying statute, then that right 
could not meet Gonzaga’s requirement that there must be “clear” and 
“unambiguous” evidence that Congress intended to establish an indi-
vidual right.251  
 Yet even after Gonzaga, a court might examine agency regula-
tions that interpret statutory language or legislative history to un-
                                                                                                                    
ing § 1983, supra note 1, at 357-59 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wilder); Monaghan, supra note 234, at 246-47 (discussing 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9). 
 247. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n. 9 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. 
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gon-
zaga, 536 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra 
note 1, at 1439-41 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 
1, at 357-59 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9); Monaghan, supra note 234, at 246-47 
(discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9). 
 248. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, su-
pra note 1, at 1448-49. 
 249. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461, 1466-69. 
 250. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (“In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights en-
forceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no 
more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied 
private right of action.”); see also id. at 283 (“We now reject the notion that our cases per-
mit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action 
brought under § 1983.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1446, 1461, 
1466 (discussing and criticizing the unambiguous evidence standard for § 1983 suits). 
 251. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461, 1466-69. 
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derstand whether Congress intended to create a statutory right.252 
Because agencies are often involved in Congress’s drafting of a stat-
ute that delegates authority to that agency, a court may find agency 
regulations useful in providing understanding of congressional in-
tent.253 Although it demanded “clear” and “unambiguous” evidence in 
a statute that Congress intended to establish individually enforce-
able rights, the Gonzaga Court did not purport to overrule the 
Court’s earlier Wright decision, which examined agency regulations 
in conjunction with a statute to help determine whether an enforce-
able right existed under § 1983, or the Chevron deference principle.254  
VI.   AFTER SANDOVAL AND GONZAGA: THE FIRST AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER REGULATIONS CAN HELP INTERPRET 
RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER § 1983 
 Because neither Sandoval nor Gonzaga clearly addressed the ex-
tent to which an agency’s interpretation of statutory rights in regula-
tions is entitled to deference, the lower courts have disagreed about 
that issue. The Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley held that valid 
agency regulations alone could not establish individual rights en-
forceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish en-
forceable rights through statutes, although Judge Berzon disagreed 
in a partial dissent.255 The Save Our Valley majority did not directly 
address the question of Chevron deference, but Judge Berzon’s par-
tial dissent did recognize the importance of that case.256 Conversely, 
the First Circuit, in Rolland v. Romney, acknowledged that regula-
tions by themselves could not establish enforceable rights, but the 
court appropriately applied Chevron deference principles in conclud-
ing that an agency’s regulations interpreting a statutory right could 
clarify a right so that it is sufficiently definite to be enforceable in a § 
1983 suit.257  
                                                                                                                    
 252. See id. at 1461-62, 1467-69, 1482. 
 253. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literal-
ism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1283-84 (1996) [hereinafter Mank, Textualist] (explain-
ing the close ties between federal agencies and the legislative process); Mank, The Future 
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461-62 (same). 
 254. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462. 
 255. Compare Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-44 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 
1983.”), with id. at 946-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part). See also infra notes 258-59, 268, 
270-78 and accompanying text.  
 256. See infra Part VI.A. 
 257. 318 F.3d 42, 48-58 (1st Cir. 2003); infra notes 303-39 and accompanying text. 
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A.   Sound Transit: Following Sandoval and Gonzaga’s Dicta 
 In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit read Gonzaga as strength-
ening and supporting the approach in Harris and South Camden that 
regulations cannot establish rights enforceable under § 1983 and as 
weakening the rationales in Loschiavo and Samuels.258 The Ninth 
Circuit held that valid agency regulations alone could not establish 
individual rights enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress 
may establish enforceable rights through statutes.259 In reaching this 
broad conclusion, the Ninth Circuit falsely assumed that Sandoval 
and Gonzaga compelled its holding and failed to consider important 
principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation, espe-
cially Chevron.260 
 The Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (“Sound 
Transit”) proposed to extend an existing rail line between Seattle and 
Sea-Tac, Washington, through south Seattle’s Rainier Valley, a pre-
dominantly minority neighborhood.261 Although most portions of the 
new line were “to be elevated above street level or to be built under-
ground,” Sound Transit decided that the segment running through 
Rainier Valley had to run at street level because of cost and other 
factors.262 Save Our Valley (SOV), a community group, brought suit 
against Sound Transit in federal district court and argued that 
Sound Transit’s proposal violated a Department of Transportation 
(DOT) disparate impact regulation263 that DOT issued pursuant to 
authority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,264 which pro-
hibits recipients of federal funds from taking actions that have a ra-
cially discriminatory effect.265 SOV also contended that this DOT 
                                                                                                                    
 258. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936-43 (discussing Gonzaga’s impact on the validity 
of Harris, South Camden, Loschiavo, and Samuels).  
 259. Id. at 935-44 (“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights 
enforceable through § 1983.”); see id. at 943-44; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735. 
 260. See Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735; infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735. 
 262. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934. 
 263. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2004). 
 264. Specifically, the regulation was promulgated under the authority of Section 602 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (2000). See 35 Fed. Reg. 10080, 10080 
(June 18, 1970). That section provides that “[e]ach Federal department and agency which 
is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is au-
thorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect 
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.” 
42 U.S.C. §2000d-1. 
 265. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (prohibiting recipients of federal funding from “uti-
liz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting persons to 
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”). SOV also alleged that 
Sound Transit’s plan violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370f (2000), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and the intentional discrimi-
nation portion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See Save Our 
Valley, 335 F.3d at 934 n.1. The district court dismissed the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act claim and granted Sound Transit summary judgment on the Fair Housing Act 
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regulation created an individual right to be free from disparate im-
pact and that this right was enforceable through § 1983.266  
 In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the DOT regulations could not establish a right en-
forceable under § 1983 and, therefore, that the defendants were enti-
tled to summary judgment.267 In light of both Sandoval and Gonzaga, 
the majority concluded that “agency regulations cannot independ-
ently create rights enforceable through § 1983.”268 In Sandoval, the 
Supreme Court had focused on the text of Title VI itself, rather than 
the implementing regulation, in determining whether the DOT regu-
lation created a private right of action.269 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that Sandoval’s emphasis on the statute’s text implied that 
“only Congress by statute can create a private right of action.”270 Al-
though acknowledging that Sandoval had dealt only with implied or 
private rights of action and had not addressed when individual rights 
are enforceable under § 1983, the majority determined that “the 
[Sandoval] Court’s reasoning applie[d] equally to both kinds of 
rights.”271 Similarly, the majority concluded that Gonzaga “confirmed 
that individual rights enforceable through § 1983 and implied private 
rights of action are similar in respects relevant to this appeal.”272 
Quoting Gonzaga, the Ninth Circuit observed that in both private 
right of action cases and § 1983 cases, “courts are required to ‘deter-
mine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.’”273  “Since 
only Congress can create implied rights of action” under Sandoval, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Gonzaga “suggests that only Con-
gress can create rights enforceable through § 1983”274 because “rights 
enforceable through § 1983, no less than implied rights of action, are 
creatures of substantive federal law.”275 The majority concluded that 
the Gonzaga decision strongly implied that “the Court’s reasoning [in 
                                                                                                                    
claim. Id. The district court also held that the claim brought under Section 601 of Title VI 
could stand if SOV could prove intentional discrimination. Id. None of these issues was 
raised on appeal. Id.; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 736. 
 266. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934-35; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 736. 
 267. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 935. 
 268. Id. at 939; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737. 
 269. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (observing that “[t]he [Sandoval] Court re-
jected the claim, basing its analysis not on the regulation’s text but on the statute’s text” 
and citing several examples of the Sandoval Court’s emphasis on the statutory language); 
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on Sandoval’s 
analysis of statutory language). 
 270. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 (discuss-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on Sandoval’s analysis of statutory language). 
 271. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937. 
 272. Id. at 938; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29. 
 273. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
283 (2002) (emphasis added)); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29. 
 274. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29. 
 275. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 n.4; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 740. 
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Sandoval] applie[d] equally to both kinds of rights”276 and that, “[l]ike 
substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce fed-
eral law must be created by Congress.”277 Accordingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that enforceable rights “cannot be created by executive 
agencies.”278  
 In a lengthy partial dissent, Judge Berzon disagreed with the ma-
jority’s conclusion that regulations can never create rights enforce-
able through § 1983. Judge Berzon contended that “the majority 
opinion demonstrates that it does not understand what a right is, 
and how it differs from a right of action.”279 Judge Berzon stated that 
“[a]ny analysis of the reach of § 1983 must . . . begin with, and not 
lose sight of, the unexceptional proposition that rights are entirely 
distinct from any private, affirmative, judicial remedy that may exist 
for violation or deprivation of those rights.”280 Judge Berzon argued 
that Sandoval had merely required that Congress create any right of 
action enforceable in a court but that neither Sandoval nor Gonzaga 
had held that Congress alone must explicitly establish rights.281 She 
explained that an individual right is simply the legal relationship be-
tween two individuals and the state and that administrative agency 
regulations almost inevitably define such relationships and rights.282 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an agency rule has the 
“force and effect of law” only if it “affect[s] individual rights and obli-
gations.”283 
 Judge Berzon responded to the majority’s argument that the San-
doval and Gonzaga decisions implied that agencies cannot create ei-
ther private rights of action or enforceable rights by observing that 
the Supreme Court had never held that administrative regulations 
may not create rights.284 To the contrary, Judge Berzon argued that 
the Court’s precedent clearly supported the view that regulations 
                                                                                                                    
 276. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737. 
 277. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
286 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Recent Case, supra note 
1, at 737-38. 
 278. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 n.4 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286); Recent 
Case, supra note 1, at 740. 
 279. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, su-
pra note 1, at 737. 
 280. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-51 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (explaining 
the difference between a right and a right of action); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737-38. 
 281. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-51 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 737-38. 
 282. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 947 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 740. 
 283. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979)) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 740. 
 284. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 954-60 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 738 (discussing Judge Berzon’s partial dissent). 
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clearly establish rights and are “laws” for purposes of § 1983, at least 
where Congress has delegated authority to agencies to promulgate 
rules having the force of law.285 After extensively discussing general 
administrative law principles, Supreme Court caselaw, and Ninth 
Circuit precedent, Judge Berzon concluded that valid federal regula-
tions could easily create “the particular form of rules that we de-
scribe as creating ‘rights.’”286 Accordingly, Judge Berzon determined 
that valid regulations that have the force and effect of law are “laws” 
within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, that where regulations 
establish individual and specific legal rights, those rights are en-
forceable under § 1983.287 
 Judge Berzon’s argument that rights are different from rights of 
action is solidly based on the Court’s precedent, including Chevron 
and Chrysler.288 If a statute is ambiguous or contains a gap, the 
Chevron decision presumes that Congress has implicitly delegated to 
the agency interpretive authority to construe the meaning of the 
statute, provided that the agency has promulgated a reasonable in-
terpretation of the statute in a rule carrying the force of law.289 Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged in Sandoval that “regulations, if valid and 
reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself.”290 Further-
more, the Supreme Court recognized in Chrysler that Congress may 
implicitly delegate the authority to define rights to an agency as long 
as it is sufficiently clear that the legislature intended to delegate to 
the agency the authority to issue regulations having the force of 
law.291 
                                                                                                                    
 285. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-60 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (citing Chrys-
ler, 441 U.S. at 308); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738. 
 286. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-59 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, 
supra note 1, at 738. 
 287. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 960-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying the 
Chrysler presumption, ‘laws’ in § 1983 includes regulations as well.”); Recent Case, supra 
note 1, at 738. Judge Berzon concluded, however, that the Title VI disparate impact regu-
lations in the case did not establish an individual right enforceable under § 1983. Save Our 
Valley, 335 F.3d at 963 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying Gonzaga to [49 C.F.R.] § 
21.5(b)(2) [(2003)], I conclude that the regulation does not create a separate right in the af-
fected group of people.”).  
 288. See supra notes 279-87, 289-91 and accompanying text. 
 289. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (stating that courts will 
defer to agency statutory interpretation where the statute is ambiguous and the agency 
has issued an interpretation in a rule carrying force of law); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating that courts will defer to an 
agency rule interpreting an ambiguous statute or a statute containing a “gap” based on the 
presumption that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency); 
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741; supra notes 21-23, 187-93 and accompanying text. 
 290. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 
741. 
 291. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1997) (explaining that Congress 
does not need to be “specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to [a congressional 
delegation of authority] can be binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes” as long as 
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 The majority’s conclusion that administrative agencies may estab-
lish neither rights of action nor any type of individual right enforce-
able through § 1983 is based on an overly broad reading of dicta in 
Sandoval and Gonzaga.292 In Sandoval, the Court concluded that the 
separation of powers doctrine requires that Congress must intend to 
create any private rights of action in the federal courts because Con-
gress alone defines federal jurisdiction and, accordingly, that regula-
tions alone may not create a private right of action.293 Congress, how-
ever, has explicitly enacted § 1983 to provide remedies for violations 
that deprive individuals of their rights under federal law, and there-
fore § 1983 suits are fully authorized by Congress under separation 
of powers principles.294 As discussed below, Chevron and subsequent 
cases firmly establish that Congress may delegate to agencies the au-
thority to define rights that carry the force of law and, hence, are en-
forceable under § 1983.295  
 The majority also appeared to rely on dicta in the Sandoval deci-
sion suggesting that only explicit statutory language may create a 
private right of action.296 However, any implication in Sandoval that 
only express statutory language may establish a private right of ac-
tion is contrary to the Court’s prior precedent, and Sandoval never 
purported to overrule that precedent.297 The Sandoval decision did 
                                                                                                                    
“the reviewing court [is] reasonably . . . able to conclude that the grant of authority con-
templates the regulations issued”); see also Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741 & n.58.  
 292. Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738-42. 
 293. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 953 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“The special 
separation of powers concerns underlying Sandoval do not apply in a § 1983 case.”); Recent 
Case, supra note 1, at 738-41 (arguing that Sandoval’s requirement that private right of 
action suits must be expressly authorized by Congress reflects separation of powers con-
cerns not applicable to enforcement of regulations under § 1983). See generally Sandoval, 
532 U.S. at 287-93 (concluding that only Congress and not agencies may create a private 
right of action); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (observing that the 
need for proof of congressional intent to authorize an implied private right of action “re-
flects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts 
controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes”). 
 294. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9 (“Because § 1983 provides an ‘alternative source of 
express congressional authorization of private suits,’ these separation of powers concerns 
are not present in a § 1983 case.” (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (citation omitted)); see also Mank, Using § 1983, 
supra note 1, at 322-24, 326, 354-57 (arguing § 1983 suits do not raise same separation of 
powers concerns as implied right of action suits because Congress has specifically author-
ized § 1983 suits to enforce federal laws creating individual rights); Sunstein, supra note 
49, at 415 (“[I]f Congress itself has created the cause of action, it cannot be argued that ju-
dicial enforcement is illegitimate judicial lawmaking.”); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738-
40 (arguing that § 1983 suits do not raise the same separation of powers concerns as im-
plied right of action suits because Congress has specifically authorized § 1983 suits to en-
force federal laws creating individual rights). 
 295. See infra Part VII. 
 296. See supra notes 213-33, 292 and accompanying text; Mank, The Future After Gon-
zaga, supra note 1, at 1461. 
 297. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern 
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of 
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not reject implied rights of action in all circumstances but held only 
that Title VI disparate impact regulations that exceed Section 601’s 
prohibition against intentional discrimination may not establish a 
private right of action.298 Even though Section 601 does not explicitly 
provide such a right of action, the Sandoval decision recognized that, 
in light of Cannon and Guardians, Section 601 creates an implied 
right of action for victims of intentional discrimination.299 Thus, 
Sandoval did not hold that a private right of action must always be 
explicit in the text of a statute, and it acknowledged that the Court 
would recognize implicit rights of action if there is sufficient evidence 
in the statute that Congress intended to create a private right of ac-
tion.300 
 The Sandoval decision itself acknowledged that a private plaintiff 
may file an implied right of action suit under Section 601 of Title VI 
alleging intentional discrimination despite the absence of express 
statutory authorization for such suits. Similarly, the Court has rec-
ognized a cause of action under Title IX for sexual harassment even 
though the statute does not explicitly prohibit such conduct because 
such suits are consistent with the statute’s core prohibition against 
intentional sex discrimination.301 Additionally, the Court has held 
that under Title IX a student may sue school officials for deliberate 
indifference concerning her complaints of sexual harassment by 
other students even though the statute contains no explicit provision 
authorizing such a private right of action.302 
B.   The First Circuit in Rolland v. Romney Considers Agency 
Regulations in Defining Rights Under § 1983 
1.   Nursing Home Reform Amendments (“NHRA”) to the Medicaid  
      Law Require States to Provide Specialized Services 
 Most recently, after the Supreme Court decided Gonzaga, the 
First Circuit, in Rolland v. Romney,303 relied on regulations in inter-
preting the scope of statutory rights.304 A class of developmentally 
                                                                                                                    
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 244 (2003) (arguing that 
Sandoval implies that a private right of action must be based on explicit statutory lan-
guage, but contending that such a view is contrary to precedent). 
 298. Black, supra note 1, at 363 & n.42; supra notes 217-29 and accompanying text. 
 299. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 
(1985), and Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 
(1983)); Short, supra note 32, at 125-26.  
 300. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-87; supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); Black, supra note 1, at 362-63 (dis-
cussing Davis and Gebser).  
 302. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; see also Black, supra note 1, at 362-63.  
 303. 318 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 304. Id. at 48-58. 
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disabled and mentally retarded residents living in Massachusetts 
nursing homes filed suit against the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts in federal district court in 1998 “on behalf of a putative class of 
approximately 1600 similarly disabled residents of Massachusetts 
nursing homes, alleging violations of a variety of federal statutes, in-
cluding 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, a part of the Nursing Home Reform 
Amendments (“NHRA”) to the Medicaid law.”305 Initially, the Com-
monwealth entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, 
which obligated the state to provide specialized services under 
NHRA to the Medicaid law, but the plaintiffs then filed a motion for 
further relief under § 1983 concerning specialized services.306 The 
plaintiff-residents sought various forms of relief but, in particular, 
requested an injunction requiring the Commonwealth to provide 
them with “specialized services,” a term given a specialized meaning 
in the NHRA and its implementing regulations.307 The United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts to provide specialized services and im-
plement a policy of active treatment.308 The state appealed. The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Romney held that (1) states are required 
to provide specialized services to persons found to require both nurs-
ing facility care and specialized services for mental illness or mental 
retardation; (2) the residents had a private right of action under § 
1983 to enforce that entitlement; and (3) the district court’s injunc-
tion requiring the state to implement a policy of “active treatment” 
for mentally retarded residents needing specialized services was 
proper.309 The First Circuit concluded that developmentally disabled 
and mentally retarded nursing home residents who were entitled to 
specialized services under the NHRA of the Medicaid law had a pri-
vate right of action to enforce those rights in an action under § 1983, 
although federal Medicaid funding is not specifically conditioned 
upon the provision of specialized services, because the term “special-
ized services” is a specific right suitable to judicial enforcement and 
the NHRA unambiguously binds the states.310  
                                                                                                                    
 305. Id. at 47-52 (finding that states are required under the Nursing Home Reform 
Amendments (NHRA) to the Medicaid law to provide specialized services to certain indi-
viduals who require services for mental illness or retardation as well as nursing facility 
care). 
 306. Id. at 44-45. 
 307. Id. at 45. 
 308. Rolland v. Celluci, 198 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Mass. 2002); Romney, 318 F.3d at 45.  
 309. 318 F.3d at 48-58. 
 310. Id. at 44-48 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various provisions of the Social Security 
Act, and applicable regulations). 
 311. Id. at 48-49. 
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 The Romney court concluded that the statutory scheme as a whole 
supported the HHS regulations.311 In interpreting the statute, the 
court initially stated that “the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage, as derived from the whole of the statute, including its overall 
policy and purpose, controls.”312 The court concluded that the statute, 
when read as a whole and in light of the HHS regulations, demon-
strated an intent to create rights on behalf of dual need patients:313 
Applying these precepts to the question of whether Congress in-
tended to require states to provide specialized services to dual 
need residents, we look first at the NHRA’s plain language. The 
NHRA is silent on this precise question, but we gather clues of 
congressional intent from several separate provisions in the stat-
ute, ever mindful of its overriding purpose, to protect individuals 
from being warehoused in nursing facilities and denied necessary 
services.314 
 Examining the statute’s structure, the First Circuit initially con-
cluded that “although the NHRA does not specify states’ obligations 
to provide specialized services to dual need residents, it does explic-
itly require states to provide specialized services to residents who do 
need them but who do not require nursing facility care.”315 In light of 
the statute’s overall structure, the First Circuit determined “[i]t is 
clear that the statute’s intent in this regard was not to elevate those 
individuals with only the need for specialized services above those 
with dual needs, but rather to bring them up to par with the dual 
needs group.”316 Additionally, Congress required states to establish a 
screening process for current and potential residents to examine both 
“whether nursing facility care is required and whether specialized 
services are required.”317 While not conclusive, the requirement of a 
screening process suggests that Congress intended states to actually 
provide the services that the screening indicated that a resident 
needed.318 Furthermore, the First Circuit found that “[a] third statu-
tory clue to Congress’s intent can be discerned in the requirement 
that states create an appeals process for individuals adversely im-
pacted by the outcome of any PASARR screening determination. It is 
clear that Congress perceived the screening as vesting individuals 
with rights to the services deemed necessary . . . .”319 
                                                                                                                    
 312. Id. at 48 (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir. 
1995)).  
 313. Id. at 48-51. 
 314. Id. at 48 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 1, at 459 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-279). 
 315. Id. at 48-49. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 49. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. (citation omitted).   
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 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley, the First Circuit in 
Romney relied in part on the interpretation of the agency responsible 
for the NHRA’s implementation, Health and Human Services (HHS). 
The First Circuit initially found that 
Congress gave the Secretary very broad duties under the 
NHRA . . . . Specifically, Congress required the Secretary to over-
see the PASARR screening process by developing “minimum crite-
ria for States to use in making [screening] determinations . . . and 
in permitting individuals adversely affected to appeal such deter-
minations.” Further, the NHRA required the Secretary to specifi-
cally monitor state compliance with certain requirements.320 
To fulfill these duties, despite the objections of several states, the 
Secretary “promulgated a rule explicitly requiring states to provide 
specialized services to dual need residents.”321 The First Circuit con-
sidered the Secretary’s interpretation in that rule along with its own 
interpretation of the statutory language and legislative history in 
concluding that the NHRA required states to provide specialized ser-
vices to dual need residents.322 In light of its own interpretation of the 
statute, the First Circuit likely would have found such a right even 
in the absence of the HHS rule. 
2.   The Right to Specialized Services in the NHRA Is Enforceable  
     Under § 1983 
 The First Circuit next addressed whether the right to specialized 
services that both it and the HHS regulations found in the NHRA is 
enforceable under § 1983. In light of Sandoval and Gonzaga, the 
First Circuit observed that the crucial issue is whether Congress in-
tended to create a private right for nursing home residents to receive 
specialized services.323 The First Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Cannon v. University of Chicago324 by maintaining that 
the most crucial factor in determining whether Congress intended to 
create a cause of action is whether the statute contains “‘right-or 
duty-creating language.’”325 
 In determining whether the NHRA contains “right-or-duty-
creating language,” the First Circuit considered the HHS regula-
tions. Quoting Sandoval, the First Circuit acknowledged that a regu-
lation “‘may not create a right that Congress has not.’”326 Even after 
                                                                                                                    
 320. See id. at 50 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(f)(8)(A), (B)) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 321. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 483.116(b)). 
 322. See id. at 50-51. 
 323. See id. at 51-52. 
 324. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 325. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13). 
 326. Id. at 52 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)). 
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Sandoval, however, the Eleventh Circuit had concluded that “regula-
tions that merely interpret a statute may provide evidence of what 
private rights Congress intended to create.”327 Citing Wright, which 
had in turn cited Chevron, the Romney court concluded that regula-
tions that interpret what rights Congress intended to create in a 
statute are “entitled to some deference.”328   
 Reviewing the statute’s language, its legislative history, and its 
interpretation by HHS, the First Circuit concluded that the NHRA 
contained “rights-creating” language that established an enforceable 
right under § 1983. The Romney court applied the three-part Bless-
ing test to decide whether the statute’s provision for “specialized ser-
vices” created an enforceable right under § 1983. The Commonwealth 
had conceded that Congress intended the statute to benefit especially 
persons such as the residents and, therefore, that the NHRA met the 
first part of the Blessing test for an enforceable right.329  
 Relying on Gonzaga, the Commonwealth contended, however, that 
the statute’s reference to “specialized services” was too vague and 
amorphous to be judicially enforceable and, accordingly, did not meet 
the second Blessing prong.330 The First Circuit relied on the HHS 
definition of specialized services in determining that the NHRA’s ref-
erence to “specialized services” was clear enough to be enforced un-
der the second Blessing standard because Congress had expressly 
delegated authority to the HHS Secretary to define the term and the 
HHS regulations provided the necessary clarity.331  
 In the instant case, the NHRA expressly delegates authority to 
define “specialized services” and the Secretary has complied. The 
agency’s definition, consistent with rights affirmed in prior case 
law, provides contextual guidance, and it is sufficient to allow 
residents to understand their rights to services, states to under-
stand their obligations, and courts to review states’ conduct in ful-
filling those obligations. In complex areas such as this, more can-
not reasonably be expected.332 
 Finally, the First Circuit concluded that the NHRA unambigu-
ously requires states to provide specialized services and, therefore, 
meets the third Blessing test.333 The statute repeatedly stated that 
states “must” screen potential residents to determine if they need 
                                                                                                                    
 327. Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Sandoval, 
532 U.S. at 284). 
 328. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & 
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987) (citing Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985)); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). 
 329. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52-53. 
 330. Id. at 53-54. 
 331. Id. at 54. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 55. 
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services, must review whether current residents need such services, 
and must consider the results of such screening and reviews in de-
termining how to provide care to patients.334 The Romney court de-
termined that the mandatory language in the NHRA made it en-
forceable under § 1983 and distinguished it from the discretionary 
right against disparate impact discrimination in the Title VI agency 
regulations that the Sandoval Court had found did not create a pri-
vate right of action.  
This is not a situation akin to that in Sandoval, where the sole 
source of the right at issue was found in the regulations and the 
statute did not utilize rights-creating language, limited the 
agency’s ability to effectuate individual rights, and focused on the 
implementing agency rather than the individuals being pro-
tected.335 
 The First Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause we find that the right 
at issue is not vague and amorphous and that the NHRA unambigu-
ously binds the states, we hold that the residents are endowed with a 
private right of action, which they may enforce via section 1983.”336 
The First Circuit had found that the statute and its legislative his-
tory at least implicitly indicated that Congress intended to establish 
a right to specialized services.337 Thus, the court found the right to 
these services in the statute itself and not the regulations.338 Where 
there were gaps in the statute regarding the definition of such ser-
vices, however, the Romney court relied upon and deferred to the 
HHS regulations.  
In the complex field of care for mentally retarded individuals and 
the related regulation of nursing homes and states, however, Con-
gress has made it clear that the Secretary is to fill in gaps and 
provide definition. The products of that delegation of authority, re-
sponding to widespread documented problems, provide an effective 
manner for care of mentally retarded nursing home residents and 
are entitled to deference.339 
Accordingly, the First Circuit, in Romney, used the agency’s interpre-
tation to help define the details of a right it had first found that Con-
gress had intended to create in the statute itself. 
                                                                                                                    
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001)). 
 336. Id. at 56.  
 337. See supra notes 275, 288-89 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text. 
 339. Romney, 318 F.3d at 58. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit reached the erroneous con-
clusion that administrative regulations can never establish rights en-
forceable through § 1983 by misreading dicta in Sandoval and Gon-
zaga.340 Instead, the Court’s precedent in Chevron and Wright sup-
ports the view that Congress may delegate to an agency the author-
ity to promulgate rules that help interpret, define, and clarify details 
in a statute so that implicit rights in a statute become sufficiently 
definite to be enforceable through § 1983.341 Under Chevron, there is, 
in effect, a rebuttable presumption that an agency’s rulemaking au-
thority includes the authority to interpret statutes and thus define 
rights.342  
 The Save Our Valley court misread Sandoval and Gonzaga in con-
cluding that agency regulations can never establish rights enforce-
able through § 1983.343 The Sandoval Court’s emphasis that only 
Congress may create a private right of action is based on separation 
of powers principles that are inapplicable in § 1983 cases.344 Because 
Congress explicitly authorized § 1983 suits to remedy violations of 
specific federal rights by state actors, Congress has met separation of 
powers requirements for such suits.345 As a private right of action 
case, Sandoval simply does not apply to rights enforceable through § 
1983.346 Although the Gonzaga Court to some extent shared the 
Sandoval Court’s concern that courts should only enforce rights that 
                                                                                                                    
 340. See supra notes 270-80, 292 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 21-23, 186-93, 289 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 21-23, 186-93, 289 and accompanying text. 
 343. Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738 n.38.  
 344. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (observing that the 
need for proof of congressional intent to authorize implied private right of action “reflects a 
concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls 
the availability of remedies for violations of statutes”); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 
335 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) (Berzon, J., dissenting in part). 
 345. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9 (“Because § 1983 provides an ‘alternative source of 
express congressional authorization of private suits,’ these separation of powers concerns 
are not present in a § 1983 case.”) (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (citation omitted); see also Mank, Using § 1983, su-
pra note 1, at 322-24, 326, 354-57 (arguing that § 1983 suits do not raise the same separa-
tion of powers concerns as implied right of action suits because Congress has specifically 
authorized § 1983 suits to enforce federal laws creating individual rights); Sunstein, supra 
note 49, at 415 (“[I]f Congress itself has created the cause of action, it cannot be argued 
that judicial enforcement is illegitimate judicial lawmaking.”); Recent Case, supra note 1, 
at 738-40. 
 346. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 300 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing majority’s decision was “something of a sport” because “[l]itigants who in the future 
wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only ref-
erence § 1983 to obtain relief”); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 739 (arguing that Sandoval 
only addressed private rights of action and not § 1983 suits). See generally Mank, Using § 
1983, supra note 1, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact regulations 
may be enforced through § 1983). 
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Congress intended to create,347 administrative agency regulations 
that have the force of law are by their very nature based on at least 
an implicit delegation by Congress to the agency to establish rights 
and, accordingly, at least in some circumstances may be enforced 
through § 1983.348  
 The First Circuit in Romney appropriately considered the agency’s 
interpretation in defining the scope of a statutory right. Although the 
statute did not explicitly state that nursing home residents had a 
right to specialized services, the First Circuit concluded that the 
statutory language as a whole and the legislative history demon-
strated that Congress had intended to create a right to specialized 
services in the NHRA. The Commonwealth argued that any such 
“right” in the statute was too vague and ambiguous to enforce be-
cause the statute does not adequately define the term “specialized 
services,” but the Romney court concluded that Congress had ex-
pressly delegated to HHS the task of defining the details of which 
services are required by the right to “specialized services” and that 
the regulations gave sufficient clarity to the definition of the term. As 
demonstrated by the Romney decision, courts should consider agency 
interpretations in deciding whether Congress created a right in a 
statute that is sufficiently clear to meet the three-part Blessing stan-
dard. The Romney decision illustrates the realities of modern admin-
istrative statutes in which Congress creates a general right and then 
delegates to an agency the task of filling in the often highly technical 
details of that right. If there is sufficient evidence in a statute and its 
legislative history that Congress intended to create a mandatory 
right on behalf of a defined group of beneficiaries, courts should en-
force that right through § 1983 even if an agency has filled some gaps 
in the details of that right. That is an example of the agency serving 
as the “sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself”349 and is 




                                                                                                                    
 347. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, 
supra note 1, at 1446-51. 
 348. See generally Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467-69; supra 
notes 157-347 and accompanying text. 
 349. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. 
